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Abstract 
The aim of this work is to show how Prolog technology can he used for efficient implementation 
of query answering in default logics. The idea is to translate a default theory along with a query into 
a Prolog program and a Prolog query such that the original query is derivable from the default theory 
iff the Prolog query is derivable from the Prolog program. In order to comply with the goal-oriented 
proof search of this approach, we focus on default theories supporting local proof procedures, as 
exemplified by so-called semi-monotonic default theories. Although this does not capture general 
default theories under Reiter’s interpretation, it does so under alternative ones’. 
For providing theoretical underpinnings, we found the resulting compilation techniques upon 
a top-down proof procedure based on model elimination. We show how the notion of a model 
elimination proof can be refined to capture default proofs and how standard techniques for 
implementing and improving model elimination theorem provers (regularity, lemmas) can be adapted 
and extended to default reasoning. This integrated approach allows us to push the concepts needed 
for handling defaults from the underlying calculus onto the resulting compilation techniques. 
This meth’od for default theorem proving is complemented by a model-based approach to 
incremental consistency checking. We show that the crucial task of consistency checking can benefit 
from keeping models in order to restrict the attention to ultimately necessary consistency checks. This 
is supported by the concept of default lemmas that allow for an additional avoidance of redundancy. 
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1. Introduction 
In many AI applications default reasoning plays an important role since many subtasks 
involve reasoning from incomplete information. This is why there is a great need for 
systematic methods that allow us to integrate default reasoning capabilities. In fact, the two 
last decades have provided us with a profound understanding of the underlying problems 
and have resulted in well-understood formal approaches to default reasoning. Therefore, 
we are now ready to build advanced default reasoning systems. For this undertaking, we 
have chosen Reiter’s default logic [71] as our point of departure. 
Default logic augments classical logic by dejbdt rules that differ from standard 
inference rules in sanctioning inferences that rely upon given as well as absent information. 
Knowledge is represented in default logics by default theories (D, W) consisting of a 
consistent set of formulas W, also called facts, and a set of default rules D. A default rule 
y has two types of antecedents: a prerequisite I_I which is established if a! is derivable 
and a justijication ,6 which is established if /l is consistent. If both conditions hold, the 
consequent y is concluded by default. A set of such conclusions (sanctioned by default 
rules and classical logic) is called an extension of an initial set of facts: given a set of 
formulas W and a set of default rules D, any such extension E is a deductively closed set 
of formulas containing W such that, for any 
if a E E and -/I 4 E then y E E. (A formal introduction to default logic is given in 
Section 2.) 
In what follows, we are interested in implementing the basic approach to query 
answering in default logic that allows for determining whether a formula is in some 
extension of a given default theory. 2 Unlike other approaches that address this problem 
by encapsulating the underlying theorem prover as a separate module, we are proposing a 
rather different approach that integrates default reasoning into existing automated theorem 
provers. In order to comply with the methodology underlying query-oriented classical 
theorem provers, it is more or less indispensable to center the overall approach around local 
proof procedures (i.e., proof procedures that allow for deciding whether a set of default 
rules forms a default proof by looking at the constituent rules only). This is because such 
procedures permit validating a default inference step during the goal-directed proof search 
in a locally determinable way (see Section 2 for details). 
The methodology presented in this paper has its origins in an approach to default query 
answering proposed in [79]. This approach integrates the notion of a default proof into a 
calculus for classical logic, which renders it especially qualified for implementations by 
means of existing theorem provers. To be more precise, Schaub [79] furnishes a mating- 
based characterization of default proofs inside the framework provided by the connection 
method [ 151. This results in a connection calculus for query answering in so-called semi- 
monotonic default logics. (The advantage of these default systems is that they allow for the 
* Membership in all extensions is actually computable by appeal to a procedure testing membership in Verne 
extension (see [89]). 
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aforementio’ned local proof procedures, as we detail in Section 2.) In fact, there are already 
numerous implementations of connection calculi. Most of them, like the high performance 
theorem prover SETHEO [47], are based on model elimination [53] which can be regarded 
as a member of the family of connection calculi. 
We draw on this relationship in this paper and show how an implementation technique 
for model elimination, namely Prolog Technology Theorem Proving (PTTP) [87,88], can 
be used for (default reasoning. Our overall contribution can thus be looked at from different 
perspectives: first, we provide implementation techniques for (semi-monotonic) default 
logics. Second, we extend an existing automated theorem prover by means for handling 
default information. In particular, we show how the notion of a model elimination proof 
can be refin’ed to capture (semi-monotonic) default proofs and how standard techniques for 
implementi:ng and improving model elimination theorem provers (regularity, lemmas) can 
be adapted and extended to default reasoning. And finally, one can view our contribution 
somehow as a logic programming system integrating disjunction, classical as well as 
default negation. 
To give a, more precise overview of our approach, we start by noting that default logic 
is among the consistency-based approaches to default reasoning. In these formalisms, a 
logical formalization of a consistency-driven procedure is added to a standard logic. As 
explained above, this is done in default logic by means of the justification of a default rule. 
In this way, default reasoning is mapped onto a deductive task and a consistency checking 
task. Of course, this carries over to the resulting proof procedures for query answering, too. 
As anticipated above, we address the deductive task of default query answering by 
appeal to techniques borrowed from Prolog Technology Theorem Proving. The idea is 
to translate a default theory along with a query into a Prolog program and a Prolog query 
such that the original query belongs to an extension of the default theory iff the Prolog 
query is derivable from the Prolog program. For providing theoretical underpinnings, we 
found the resulting compilation techniques upon a top-down proof procedure based on 
model-elimination. This proof procedure has its roots in the mating-based characterization 
of default query answering given in [79], which also integrates the notion of a default proof 
into a calculus for classical logic. This integrated approach allows us to push the concepts 
needed for handling defaults from the underlying calculus, over the corresponding proof 
procedure, into the resulting compilation techniques. 
As regards the task of consistency checking, the first interesting question is whether 
we can find a way of pruning “inconsistent subproofs” while reducing the computational 
efforts for consistency checking. For this, we observe that a formula is consistent (or 
satisfiable) iff it has a model. This leads us to the following incremental approach to 
consistency checking: we start with a model of the initial set of facts. Each time, we 
apply a default rule, we check whether the actual model satisfies the underlying default 
assumptions (which can be done in linear time in propositional logic). If this is the case, 
we continue proving. If not, we try to generate a new model of the initial set of facts 
satisfying the current as well as all default assumptions underlying the partial default proof 
at hand. If we succeed, we simply continue proving under the new model. Otherwise, we 
know that the considered default assumption cannot be assumed in a consistent way (since 
there is no model for the continuation of our current default proof with the default rule at 
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hand). In this way, we restrict the generation of new models to the ultimately necessary 
ones. 
The second interesting question is then whether a simultaneous treatment of theorem 
proving and satisfiability checking allows for proof procedures benefiting from structure 
and information sharing. This is important since the two tasks encompass genuine and 
even orthogonal sources of (putative) exponential complexity, as reflected by the fact 
that query answering in default logics is El-complete [42]. For addressing this issue, 
the idea is to communicate information from the theorem prover to a model generator. 
This communication is accomplished by (default) lemma handling. That is, apart from the 
traditional usage of lemmas for improving inferential processes, we use them furthermore 
as a communication device between two such processes. We will see that this allows for a 
drastic reduction of the search space in case a new model has to be generated. 
The paper is organized as follows. After inserting the current work into the literature, 
we provide in Section 2 an introduction to default logic along with its basic proof theory 
(for normal default theories, see below). Section 3 introduces then a model-elimination 
calculus that is proven to be sound and complete for query answering in (normal) default 
logic. This calculus furnishes the theoretical foundation of the compilation techniques 
introduced in Section 5. This section extends the work found in [75]. While our integral 
approach addresses full-fledged (semi-monotonic) default logics, which support local proof 
procedures, we restrict our exposition up to Section 6 to so-called normal default theories 
over a propositional language. This restriction is justified by the fact that except for 
consistency checking all techniques developed for normal default theories carry over to 
the general case without any modifications. Hence, we present in Section 4 our model- 
based approach to consistency checking with normal default theories. This section extends 
the work found in [20]. We ultimately lift the overall approach to general default theories 
in Section 6. We accomplish this by extending the model-based approach of Section 4 in 
order to encompass the variety of consistency checks found in existing default logics. This 
builds on the work in [76]. As a final outcome, we obtain a PTTP-based implementation 
platform for query answering in default logics that support local proof procedures. 
We draw the reader’s attention right from the start to the fact that this paper focuses 
on the fundamentals of our approach, such as proof theoretical issues and compilation 
techniques. A more detailed description of the resulting system along with more 
experimental analysis can be found in [59]; a companion paper on further implementation 
techniques is in preparation, For an impression, consult Appendix A containing an example 
along with the resulting “object-code”. 
Our system is freely available at [83]. Documentation and sets of test cases can be 
obtained from the same location. In order to make use of the system you will need a 
standard Prolog system, preferably Eclipse Prolog. 
In what follows, we assume the reader to be familiar with the basic concepts of propo- 
sitional and first-order logic [ 10,321 and we presume some acquaintance with automated 
theorem proving [15,53] and programming language Prolog [27]. Throughout the paper, 
we deal with the propositional case, even though our implementation treats variables over 
a finite universe (in the rudimentary sense that a formula or a rule, respectively, is regarded 
as the representative of all its ground instances; thus, skolemization is not considered). We 
give some details of this in Section 5.2.5. 
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1.1. Related work 
The question of determining whether a formula is in some extension of a given default 
theory was first addressed in [71]. An alternative approach was recently proposed in [79]. 
In contrast to this, most of the work found in the literature focuses on the determination of 
entire extensions, like [2,11,25,45,50,63,81,82], or related decision procedures, like [62, 
631. In the former approaches, queries are then answerable either by look-up operations 
or by rest:ricting the construction of extension to those containing the query at hand. 
Junker and Konolige [45] and Levy [50] propose truth maintenance based systems. Ben- 
Eliyahu and Dechter [ 1 l] reduce default reasoning to a constraint satisfaction problem. 
Among the approaches integrating default reasoning into inference systems for classical 
logic, we find in 1821 a tableaux-based framework for the computation of extensions of 
normal default theories; it was extended to full-fledged classical default logic in [81] 
and to justified and constrained default logic in (721. In this framework, clausal tableaux 
are used Sor capturing maximal sets of “consistent default rules”. Unlike this, Amati 
et al. [2] use parallel tableaux for capturing at once default inferences and consistency 
checks. In both approaches, final extensions are then characterized by a resulting tableau. 
Another hybrid method is used in [17], where a cut-free sequent calculus is proposed. 
This system consists of three parts: a classical LK-calculus, a sequent calculus based 
on “antisequents” for consistency checking, and certain default inference rules. Along 
this line of research, Bonatti and Olivetti [16] propose a sequent calculus for skeptical 
reasoning in default logic. In contrast to these approaches, many others, like [5,25,45,63, 
7 11, abstract from an underlying inference engine and presuppose an automated theorem 
prover mo’dule furnishing an oracle for classical inference relations. There is also a variety 
of approaches addressing certain fragments of default logic, like [ 13,18,7 1,821, and notably 
Poole’s Theorist framework [64,65,67,69]. 
Apart from the context of default logic, we mention the work on automating autoepis- 
temic logic, e.g., [61,62], and circumscription, e.g., [6,37,39,43,70]. Among them, though 
conceptually different from our approach, Gelfond and Lifschitz [37] compile circumscrip- 
tion into logic programs, while Przymusinski [70] uses a form of linear resolution that is 
related to model elimination. 
Along the broader theme of our work, that is, the utilization of standard automated 
theorem proving techniques for implementing default reasoning, there is clearly a broader 
range of background literature. Among them, we find the work of Hoppe [44] and 
Sattar [74] dealing with incremental (default) reasoning in different settings, such as the 
aforementioned Theorist framework in the latter case. Moreover, a lot of effort has already 
been devoted to specific topics, like consistency checking, lemma handling, etc., on which 
outcomes we rely without giving a detailed account of the literature. And last but not least 
we mentia’n the large efforts taken in the logic programming community for implementing 
extended logic programming [36]. 
Among the aforementioned approaches to default reasoning, an exposed position is 
arguably held by those of the groups around NiemelH [63] and around Marek and 
Truszczyiiski [25], also due to the impressive performances exhibited by their default rea- 
soning systems. These approaches are orthogonal to the one proposed in this paper for three 
reasons: (i) they aim primarily at computing entire extensions (comprising query answer- 
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ing in the aforementioned way), (ii) they deal with Reiter’s original default logic only, and 
(iii) they encapsulate the underlying theorem prover. Moreover, Niemela [63] puts strong 
emphasis on conflict resolution techniques, while Cholewidski et al. [25] discuss in depth 
the influence of stratification techniques (see below). In this paper, we shift the emphasis 
towards the utilization of classical automated theorem proving techniques, while adopting 
a query-oriented perspective on default reasoning that relies on local proof procedures. (As 
regards (iii), we acknowledge that our final implementation is also not fully homogeneous 
since we use an independent Davis-Putnam procedure [28] for model-finding.) 
As mentioned in the introductory section, our decision to center the approach around 
local proof procedures is motivated by the desire of integrating it into an existing goal- 
oriented, top-down automated theorem prover. We thus aim at verifying the validity of each 
inference step when it is performed in order to improve upon proof search. A related aim 
is found in approaches plitting default theories into smaller parts in order to apply default 
reasoning in a local way. Among them, we find [26,33,90]. For example, Cholewinski [26] 
takes up the notion of stratification techniques known in logic programming [3], which 
provide a salient part of the DeReS system [25]. 
In all, our restriction to default theories supporting local proof procedures (exemplified 
by semi-monotonic default theories) should be seen as a compromise between (i) our 
ultimate goal to exploit the deductive power of advanced inference engines and (ii) the 
expressiveness of the default theories under consideration. The latter has to do with the 
fact that default logics denying semi-monotonicity, like Reiter’s full-fledged default logic, 
necessitate the inspection of aZE default rules for answering no matter what query. This 
setting is incompatible with the idea behind local, goal-oriented proof procedures; it rather 
requires a more global approach relying arguably on bottom-up procedures. This also 
explains why many of the aforementioned approaches to Reiter’s original default logic 
are primarily interested in the computation of entire extensions: their setting necessitates 
the inspection of the entire set of default rules anyway. 
2. Default logic 
This section introduces Reiter’s classical default logic along with some important formal 
concepts needed for providing a proof theory adequate for our purposes. 
As already sketched in the introductory section, default logic augments classical logic 
by default rules of the form 3 !G! . Such a rule is called normal if B is equivalent to y; it 
is called semi-normal if /I impli& y . We sometimes denote the prerequisite u of a default 
rule 6 by Prereq(G), its justification /? by Justif(S) and its consequent y by Conseq(G). 
Accordingly, Prereq(D) is the set of prerequisites of all default rules in D; ./z&f(D) 
and Conseq(D) are defined analogously. A set of default rules D and a set of consistent 
formulas 4 W form a default theory (D, W) that may induce a single or multiple extensions 
in the following way [7 11. 
3 Reiter [71] considers default rules having finite sets of justifications. Marek and Truszczyriski [57] show that 
any such default rule can be tmnsformed into a set of default rules having a single (or no) justification. 
4 The restriction to consistent set of facts is not really necessary, but it simplifies matters. 
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Definition 2.1. Let (D, W) be a default theory. For any set of formulas S, let r(S) be the 
smallest set of formulas S’ such that: 
(1) w c S’; 
(2) Th(S’) = S’; 
(3) for any y E D, if a! E S’ and S U {j3} is consistent then y E S’. 
A set of formulas E is a classical extension of (D, W) iff r(E) = E. 
Observe that E must be a fixed point of r. Any such set represents a possible set of 
beliefs about the world at hand. 
As already put forward in [71], query answering in default logics is most feasible in 
the presence of the property of semi-monotonicity: if D’ C D for two sets of default 
rules, then if E’ is an extension of (D’, W), there is an extension E of (D, W) such that 
E’ C E. Given this property, it is sufficient to consider a relevant subset of default rules 
while answering a query, since applying other default rules would only enlarge and thus 
preserve a Rartial extension at hand. In Reiter’s default logic, semi-monotonicity is enjoyed 
by normal default theories. Moreover, all major variants of default logic such as classical 
default logic [71], justified default logic [55], cumulative default logic 5 [19], constrained 
default logi’c [30], and rational default logic [58] coincide on this particular fragment. This 
is why we have chosen normal default theories as an initial exemplar for our approach. We 
show in Section 6 how general default theories are treated in the aforementioned variants, 
provided they enjoy semi-monotonicity. 
In the presence of semi-monotonicity, extensions are constructible in a truly iterative 
way by applying one applicable default rule after another by appeal to a rather local notion 
of consistency: 
Theorem 2.1. Let (D, W) be a normal default theory and let E be a set offormulas. Then, 
E is an extension of (D, W) ifs there is some maximal D’ 5 D that has an enumeration 
(6i)iet such thatfor i E I, we have: 
E = Th( W U Conseq( D’)), 
W U lConseq({Go, . . . , Si-I}) k Prereq(&), 




This type of characterization was first given in [82], except for condition (3) reflecting 
an incremental approach, as opposed to a rather global approach requiring 
W U Conseq(D’) v 1. 
Condition (2) spells out that D’ has to be grounded in W. In general, a set of default 
rules D is grounded in a set of facts W iff there exists an enumeration (6i)iez of D that 
satisfies condition (2). Condition (3) expresses the notion of incremental consistency. Here, 
the “consistent” application of a default rule is checked at each step, whereas this must be 
done with respect to the$nal extension in a non-semi-monotonic default logic. 
5 This is meant modulo the augmented language used by this system (see Section 6 for more details). 
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These notions lead us to the following notion of a default proof from normal default 
theories, on which we build our initial formal characterization of query answering: 
Definition 2.2. Let (II, W) be a normal default theory and (p a formula. A normal default 
proof for p from (D, W) is a finite sequence of default rules (6i)iC1 with 6i E D for all 
i E I such that W U {Conseq(&) 1 i E I} t- yz~ and conditions (2) and (3) are satisfied for all 
i E I. 
The following immediate consequence of Theorem 2.1 assures that a query is in some 
extension of the (normal) default theory at hand iff it has a (normal) default proof: 6 
Theorem 2.2. Let (D, W) be a normal default theory and cp a formula. Then, q E E for 
some extension E of (0, W) iff there is a normal defaultprooffor q from (D, W). 
That is, for verifying whether q is in some extension of a default theory (D, W), it is 
enough to determine a grounded and consistent set of default rules D, C D that allows for 
proving 60 from the facts in W and the consequents of all default rules in OP. 
Now, given the concept of a default proof, let us elucidate the computational advantage 
of local proof procedures provided by semi-monotonicity: for deciding whether a set of 
default rules forms a default proof, it is sufficient to investigate the constituent rules only. 
A local proof procedure must thus never consider a rule in (D \ Dq) for deciding whether 
D, is a default proof for some query (o. Note that in the absence of a property like semi- 
monotonicity a proof procedure must necessarily consider all default rules in the given 
default theory. 7 This is, for instance, the case for general default theories under Reiter’s 
interpretation. Finally, we emphasize that we are not interested in semi-monotonicity as 
such, it is rather the resulting localness of proof procedures that we draw upon, since 
this is an essential feature of the model elimination based theorem provers that we are 
aiming at. 
As an example, consider the following set of statements about a child predisposed 
to an allergy against milk products: ’ “children normally eat ice-cream”, “ice-cream 
usually contains mill<“, “ice-cream usually contains sugar”, and “milk is an allergen 
in case of a predisposition”. The corresponding default theory along with facts child A 
predispo (expressing that the considered child has the aforementioned predisposition) is 
the following one: 
child : icecream icecream : milk icecream : sugar 
icecream ’ milk ’ sugar 
[child, predispo, milk A predispo -+ allergen} . 
(4) 
6 Since we deal with normal default theories up to Section 6, we omit the prefix norm01 up to this point. 
7 Unless it has a particular syntactical structure allowing for “localizing” the proof procedure, for instance by 
stratification [3] or similar techniques. 
* This is actually an extremely rich and non-trivial domain for studying default reasoning. 
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For instance, we can explain the presence of an allergen in the above situation by proving 
allergen from child A predispo by means of default proof: 
( 
chilcl : icecream icecream : milk 
icecream ’ 1 milk ’ 
(5) 
Importantly, this proof can be found by a top-down backward-chaining procedure that starts 
from the query by ignoring irrelevant default rule 
icecream : sugar 
sugar ’ 
This illustrates the great advantage of local proof procedures. 
For the most part of the paper, we follow [79] in dealing with default theories in atomic 
format in the following sense: for a default theory (D, W) in language CZ over some 
alphabet Z, let Lz/ be the language over the alphabet Z’, obtained by adding three new 
propositions, named og , #?s, ys for each 6 E D. Then, (D, W) is mapped into default theory 
(D’, W’) in Lx, where 
The resulting default theory (D’, W’) is called the atomic format of the original default 
theory, (D, W). As shown in [73], this transformation does not affect the computation of 
queries to the original default theory. That is in terms of default proofs, given a query ye in 
LE, then p has a default proof from (D, W) iff q has a default proof from (D’, W’). We 
can therefore restrict our attention to atomic default rules without losing generality. The 
advantages of atomic default rules over arbitrary ones are, first, that their constituents are 
not spread over several clauses while transforming them into clausal format (see Section 3) 
and, second, that these constituents are uniquely referable to. The motivations for this 
format are somehow similar to the ones for definitional clausal form in automated theorem 
proving [31]. For default reasoning, the naming of defaults was first done by Poole in [67]. 
For clarity, we refrain from turning default rules into their atomic counterparts whenever 
they are composed of atomic components. This is for instance the case with Default 
theory (4). For an example of the transformation the reader is referred to Section 4; 
Section 5.2 describes its benefits on the implementation level. 
3. Query answering in default logics 
The aim of this section is to provide formal underpinnings for the compilation techniques 
to be introduced in Section 5. As mentioned in the introductory section, our approach 
is rooted in the mating-based characterization of default proofs developed in [79]. Such 
matings are used in connection calculi as a structure-oriented means for characterizing the 
unsatisfiability of formulas. For brevity, we refer the reader for details on this approach to 
[79] and confine ourselves in what follows to an introduction to its underlying ideas, needed 
for a better understanding of the model elimination calculus, presented in the major part of 
this section. 
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First of all, we introduce the following conventions: we let Lc denote the literal 
complementary to L. We mainly deal with formulas in conjunctive normal form (CNF), 
which are given by a conjunction of disjunctions of literals. To ease notation, we denote 
such formulas in clausal form, that is, a formula in CNF is given as a set of clauses, where 
a clause is a set of literals {L 1, . . . , L,] representing a disjunction L1 v f . . v L,. A clause 
is called negative iff it contains only negative literals. 
The mating-based characterization of default proofs relies on the idea that an atomic 
default rule G can be decomposed into a classical implication u + y along with two 
proof-theoretii conditions on the usage of the resulting clause {-LX, v}; these conditions are 
referred to as admissibility and compatibility. Intuitively, both of them rely on a sequence 
of clauses, stemming from default rules only, which is induced by the underlying mating 
(see [79]). Such a sequence amounts to an enumeration of default rules (&)i,~, as given 
in Theorem 2.1 and Definition 2.2. In fact, while admissibility provides the proof-theoretic 
counterpart of condition (2), that is groundedness, compatibility enforces the notion of 
consistency described in condition (3). 
Now, in order to find out whether a formula p is in some extension of a default theory 
(D, W), we proceed as follows: first, we transform the default rules in D into a set of 
indexed implications WD. In our example, this encoding yields the set 
WD = {childs, + icecreams,, icecreams, -+ milks,, icecreams, + sugar,,). (6) 
The indexes denote the respective default rules in (4) from left to right. 9 
Second, we transform both W and Wo into their clausal forms, Cw and CD. The clauses 
in CD are called 8-clauses; they are of the form lo { YCQ, ~8); all other clauses are referred 
to as w-clauses. In our example, we obtain the following clause set for CW U Co: 
{ {predispo}, {child), (-predispo, -milk, allergen}} U 
{ {-childs, , icecreams, 1, [-icecreams,, milks,}, (-icecreamg, sugars,}}. (7) 
Finally, a query 60 is derivable from (D, W) iff the set of clauses Cw U CD U 
{{-lp}] is unsatisfiable and agrees with the (mating-based) concepts of admissibility and 
compatibility. 
3.1. A default model elimination calculus 
For providing the formal underpinnings for our compilation techniques, we develop in 
the sequel a proof procedure which finds a (default) refutation for -(D from clause set 
CW U CD iff there exists a default proof for (p from (D, W). 
Unlike [79] though, we address this problem by means of a variant of model elimination 
(ME) [53]. This is because the mating-based approach provides a purely declarative 
characterization of default proofs, which is much too abstract o provide an adequate basis 
for the compilation techniques to be introduced in Section 5. In particular, it does not 
provide means for representing derivations and it cannot reflect the relation between goals 
9 Of course, these indexes do not influence two literals’ complementarity. 
lo Recall that the atomic format allows us to deal with binary S-clauses only. 
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and their subgoals. In contrast to this, an adequate account of these notions is furnished by 
a ME-based approach. 
The basic inference steps of ME-based calculi are called extension and reduction step. 
Intuitively, an extension step amounts to Prolog’s use of input resolution: a subgoal L is 
resolved with an input clause { Lc, K1, . . . , Kn} resulting in the new subgoals K1 , . . . , K, . 
For illustration, let us consider the clauses in (7) along with query allergen: we can resolve 
initial goal -allergen with clause {-predispo, -milk, allergen]. The resulting subgoal 
Tmilk can then be resolved with clause {milks,, Acecreams,} and so on. The reduction 
step renders the inference system complete for (full) propositional clause logic: a subgoal 
is solved if it is complementary to one of its ancestor subgoals. l1 In our example, we thus 
obtain the set {-allergen, -milk] of ancestor goals after the two aforementioned extension 
steps; this allows for applying subsequently reduction steps to putative subgoals allergen 
and milk. 
For incorporating default reasoning into such a calculus, both inference steps have to be 
adapted appropriately: first, one has to take care of groundedness (cf. condition (2)). To 
this end, we have to guarantee that whenever a d-clause {-US, ys} is used as input clause, 
(i) only ye is resolved upon, and (ii) after such an “extension step” the ancestor goals of 
the resulting subgoal -cog must not be used for subsequent reduction steps. Moreover, (iii) 
each such “extension step” must guarantee the consistency with the previous proof segment 
(cf. condition (3)). 
Among the diverse mouldings of ME-based calculi, we consider a variant that relies on 
so-called ME-tableaux as basic proof objects (cf. [47,48]). Note that the original definition 
of ME given in [54] is based on so-called ME-chains which, roughly speaking, correspond 
to open tableau branches (see below). Our choice to use ME-tableaux rather than ME- 
chains as basic proof objects is motivated by the requirement to consider from time to 
time whole derivations during a deduction for checking consistency. Such a global view on 
derivations is furnished by entire ME-tableaux. 
In what follows, we restrict the definitions to the propositional case (corresponding 
definitions for full clause logic can be found in [47,48]). The following list gives definitions 
of the concepts needed for the resulting ME-calculus: 
Literal tree. A literal tree is a pair (t, h) consisting of an ordered tree t and a labeling 
function h assigning literals to the non-root nodes in t. 
We say node a in t is labeled with literal L, if h(o) = L. 
Successor sequence. The successor sequence of a node o in an ordered tree t is the 
sequence of nodes with immediate predecessor o, in the order given by t. 
Clausal tableau. A (CZUUSUZ) tableau 7 of a set of clauses M is a literal tree (t, h) in 
which {h(ol), . . . , A(o,)} E M for every maximal successor sequence (01, . . . , 0,). 
Tableau clause and literals. Such a clause (k(ol), . . . , h(on)} E M is called a tableau 
clause and the elements of a tableau clause are called tableau Ziterals. 
’ ’ This is why in implementations 
previous input clause. 
these goals are normally accumulated by keeping the one from each 
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Depth of a tableau clause. The depth of a tableau clause {h(ot), . . . , h(on)) in a clausal 
tableau (t, A) is defined as the depth of 01 in t (where the root node oft has depth 0, and 
the depth of a non-root node in t is the depth of its direct predecessor plus one). 
Model elimination tableau. A tableau is called model elimination tubkau (ME-tableau) 
if each inner node o labeled with a literal L has a leaf node o’ among its immediate 
successor nodes which is labeled with literal Lc. 
Given a tableau 7 containing some node o, we often denote the literal attached to o in 
7 by Al(o) (or simply h(o), if clear from the context). 
Branch. A brunch of a tableau 7 is a sequence (or, . . . , on) of nodes in 7 such that or 
is the root of 7, oi is the immediate predecessor of oi+r for 1 < i < II, and o,, is a leaf 
of7. 
We sometimes denote a branch (or, . . . , o,,) by a sequence containing the labels of its 
nodes, that is, we write (k-(02), . . . , h(o,)) (note that the root node of a tableau is never 
labeled with a literal). 
Complementary branch. A brunch is complementary if the labels of its nodes 01, . . . , on 
contain some literal L and its complement Lc. 
Open and closed branch. In order to distinguish the simple presence of a complementary 
branch and the detection of this fact, we allow to label branches as closed. 
Each branch which is labeled as closed must be complementary. A branch which is not 
marked as closed is called an open branch. 
Open and closed tableau. A tableau is closed if each of its branches is closed, otherwise 
it is open. 
Ancestor node and ancestor literal. Given a branch (01, . . . , on) in an ME-tableau 7, 
we call oi an ancestor (node) of oj and h7(oi) an ancestor (literal) of A7(oj) iff i -C j. 
We denote the immediate ancestor oi of node oi+r by prev(oi). 
Successor node and successor literal. Correspondingly, we call oi a successor (node) of 
oj and h7(oi) a successor (liter&) of k7(oj) iff i > j. 
Open goal. Let b be an open branch of an ME-tableau 7. If literal L is the label of the 
leaf node of b, then L is called an open goal of 7. 
Consider the ME-tableau 7 given in Fig. 1; it contains three tableaux clauses (namely, 
{-allergen), [allergen, -milk, -predispo} and {milks,, -icecreams,)) and four branches 
(namely, (-allergen, allergen), (-allergen, lpredispo), (-allergen, -milk, milks,) and 
(-allergen, -milk, -icecreams,)). Two of these branches (the first and third one) are com- 
plementary since they contain complementary literals and can therefore be labeled as 
closed. Closed branches are marked by underlining their leaf nodes. Since 7 contains 
open branches it is not closed. 
The following theorem, proven among others in [49], forms the basis of calculi using 
ME-tableaux as proof objects: 
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lallergen 
allergen lpredispo Tmilk 
milks, Acecream6, 
Fig. 1. An M!Stableau of clause set (7) with query allergen. Each node of the tableau is represented by its label 
except for the root node which is depicted by a. 
Theorem 3.1. Let M be a clause set. Then, M is unsatis~able $ there exists a closed 
model elimination tableau of M. 
Based on the above definitions, we are now apt to introduce the inference steps for the 
model-elimination-based calculus needed for furnishing a top-down technique generating 
ME-tableaux: the first inference step to be introduced is the so-called initialization step; 
it allows to build initial tableaux consisting of a root node and one tableau clause. By 
using so-called w-extension steps and b-extension steps, respectively, tableaux can then be 
extended by w- and b-clauses from a given clause set. Finally, reduction steps are used to 
check the c~omplementarity of an open goal to some of its ancestors. 
Throughlout the following definitions, let 7 = (t , h) be an arbitrary yet fixed tableau of 
some set of input clauses M = CW U Co, comprising a set CW of o-clauses and a set CD 
of d-clauses. 
Definition .3.1 (Znitializ,ation step). Tableau 7’ is obtained by an initialization step in the 
following way. 
l Let o be the root of a one-node tree. 
Select in M a negative o-clause {L 1, . . . , L, } E M. 
l Then, attach n new successor nodes to o, and label them in turn with L1 , . . . , L, . 
ILl,..., L,,) is called top-clause. 
For extending tableaux, we define two different variants of extension steps. The first 
variant is restricted to use input clauses from CW (i.e., w-clauses) for tableau expansion; 
this is identical to the extension step in classical ME-calculi. 
Definition 3.2 (w-extension step). Tableau 7’ is obtained from 7 by an w-extension step 
in the following way. 
. Select in t a leaf node o of an open branch labeled with literal L. 
Let(Lt,..., L,}beaw-clauseinMsuchthatLC=L~forsomeiE(1,...,n). 
. Then, attach n new successor nodes 01, . _ , o, to o, and label them in turn with 
Ll,. . , Ln, respectively. 
l The new branch with leaf node oi is marked as closed. 
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For extending tableaux by 8-clauses from Co, we introduce S-extension steps. To begin 
with, their definition must reflect the fact that defaults are inference rules rather than 
formulas: a clause (-crs, ~6) from Co can only be applied to a branch with open goal 
7~6. Taking into account that ME is a top-down backward-chaining calculus, this amounts 
to the application of the underlying default rule. Note that taking { -cz!g , ye} as an ordinary 
w-clause allows for applying a w-extension step to an open goal a~; this corresponds to 
reasoning by contraposition, which denies the inference rule character of default rules. 
Such inferences are disallowed by s-extension steps: 
Definition 3.3 (&extension step). Tableau 7’ is obtained from 7 by a a-extension step in 
the following way. 
l Select in t a leaf node o of an open branch labeled with literal L. 
Let { -cq, ys} be a d-clause in M such that Lc = ys . 
l Then, attach the two new successor nodes 01 and 02 to o, and label them in turn with 
-og and ys, respectively. 
l The new branch with leaf node 02 is marked as closed. 
In what follows, we need the following vocabulary: considering Definition 3.2 
(Definition 3.3, respectively), we call oi (02) an o-extension node (b-extension node), 
and each element of (01, . . . , o,} \ {oi) ((ol}), w-extension-resulting node (A-extension- 
resulting node), or simply a non-extension node. A literal attached to an w-extension 
node (J-extension node) is called o-extension literal (a-extension literal), otherwise non- 
extension lited. We sometimes omit the prefixes w- and a-whenever it is clear from the 
context. 
As argued above, the use of &clauses for tableaux extension must reflect the properties 
of default rules. Apart from being an inference rule, default rules must be applied in a 
consistency-preserving way. Transposed to &clauses, we must guarantee that a S-extension 
step with b-clause (-US, ys} does not violate consistency criterion (3) in Theorem 2.1. To 
this end, it is sufficient to check whether ys is consistent with all other &extension literals 
in the current derivation. l2 
Definition 3.4 (Compatible S-extension step). Let 7 be a tableau and let { ys, , . . . , ysj} be 
the set of S-extension literals occurring in ‘7. 
A d-extension step with S-clause {-a,~, ~8) applied to 7 is called compatible if CW U 
h, 9 . . .9 ysj } U (~6) is consistent. 
Observe that although this definition is in accord with consistency condition (2) 
regarding their common incremental flavor, it involves a different set of underlying default 
rules. This is because the latter condition is conceived in a bottom-up fashion, while 
Definition 3.4 relies on a top-down approach. For a default rule 8k in an entire default proof 
(&)iCI > the former criterion involves default rules in (& )i<k, while the latter considers 
default IIlk in (8i)i>k. 
I2 Note that &extension literals correspond (as long as normal default rules are considered) to the justifications 
of the respective default rules. 
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lallergen -allergen -allergen 
allergen lpredispo -milk allergen lpredispo lmilk 
* +cecreams, 
Fig. 2. The tableaux generated by three derivation steps from clause set (7) and top-clause (-allergen]. 
Even though all these conceptions involve multiple default rules or b-clauses, respec- 
tively, it is always sufficient to restrict our attention to those used in the actual derivation 
only. This is due to the notion of localness backed up by semi-monotonicity. Nonethe- 
less compatibility has a special status because it necessitates a more global treatment as 
opposed to I~- and b-extension steps. We come back to this issue at the end of this section. 
Actually, Definition 3.3 furnishes only one-half of the machinery needed for ensuring the 
inference rule character of default rules. Intuitively, this is because we must also eliminate 
reasoning by cases for S-clauses. This is done by restricting the well-known reduction 
step in classical ME-calculi. The sole difference is that subgoals of a S-extension-resulting 
literal -CQ must not be solved by reduction steps using ancestors of -CQ. l3 There must 
thus exist an independent default proof of -o!g, which ignores all ancestors of -a~, or in 
other words, there must exist a closed ME-tableau with top-clause {-US}. 
Definition 3.5 (Reduction step). Tableau T is obtained from I in the following way. 
l Select in t the leaf node Ok of an open branch b = (01, . . . , Ok) where Ok is labeled 
with literal L . 
l If there is an ancestor node oi on b labeled with literal Lc and all nodes Oi+t , . . . , Ok 
are w-extension-resulting nodes, then mark b as closed. 
Consider the three tableaux depicted in Fig. 2. The leftmost tableau 7j is generated 
by an initialization step with top-clause {-allergen}. The second tableau 72 is generated 
from 55 by iapplying an o-extension step with o-clause {allergen, -milk, -predispo) to the 
sole open goal -allergen. The rightmost tableau emerges from 72 by the application of a 
&extension step with 8-clause {Acecreams,, milks,} to open goal -milk. 
The above inference steps provide us with a sound and complete calculus, as given in 
the next definition: 
Definition 3.6 (Default model elimination). A sequence (‘Tr, . . . , 7n) of ME-tableaux is 
called a DME-derivation for a clause set M (called the set of input clauses) if: 
l 71 is obtained by an initialization step and 
l for 1 K: i 6 n, x is obtained from x-1 by applying to 3-1 either 
- a reduction step, 
l3 This restriction reflects the property of admissibility, introduced in [79]. 
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Fig. 3. Generating a closed tableau from clause set (7) and top-clause (-allergen}. 
- a w-extension step, or 
- a compatible &extension step. 
A DME-derivation is called a DME-refutation if it generates a closed tableau. 
Observe that each clause used in an extension step is by definition an input clause. 
For convenience, we sometimes identify the elements of a derivation (namely the 
tableaux) with their generating inference steps: we thus write (dl, . . . , dn) instead of 
Pi,...,ln), where each di denotes the instance of the respective inference rule used for 
obtaining z. 
Let L be an open goal attached to a node o in an ME-tableau 7. A DME-subderivation 
2, for o (or L) is a sequence of derivation steps where the first element of D selects o and 
each further element selects a descendant of o. ID is called a DME-subrefutation if after 
applying V to 7, each branch containing o is closed. We sometimes omit the prefix DME 
whenever it is clear from the context. 
We continue the example developed in Fig. 2. A DME-refutation for query allergen 
from clause set (7) can be constructed as follows: first, a w-extension step with w-clause 
(predispo) is applied to open goal -predispo of the rightmost tableau in Fig. 2. Second, a 
d-extension step with &clause [-childs, , icecreams, } is applied to open goal Acecreams,. 
As a result, we get a tableau (the leftmost tableau in Fig. 3) containing a single open branch. 
This open branch is closed by the application of a w-extension step with unit clause {child}. 
Hence, the resulting tableau (the one in the right in Fig. 3) is closed and so we have found 
a DME-refutation of allergen from clause set (7). 
The following theorem tells us that a mechanism generating DME-derivations in an 
exhaustive manner constitutes a sound and complete proof mechanism for query answering 
in default logic (here, restricted to normal default theories). 
Theorem 3.2. Let (D, W) be a normal default theory and CP be an atomic formula. Let M 
be the clausal representation of the atomic format of (D, W). 
Then, there is a defaultprooffor q from (D, W) iff there is a DME-refutation for M with 
top-clause {IQ”}. 
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The restriction to atomic queries is no limitation of the approach, since an arbitrary 
query formula 4 can always be replaced by an atomic one, say rp, and an additional formula 
4 + q in IV. (This technique is also used by PTTP [86].) 
It is worth emphasizing that for pure propositional clause sets without S-clauses, Default 
Model Elimination behaves exactly like ordinary ME (as defined for, example, in [47]). 
This is because: 
l the definitions of initialization steps and w-extension steps are exactly the same as for 
classical propositional ME-calculi, 
l 6-extension steps do not enter the derivation, and 
l if no d-clauses are used during a derivation, DME-reduction steps correspond exactly 
to classical ME-reduction steps. 
The material presented in this section constitutes the fundamental basis for our approach 
to compiling query answering in default logic. The resulting DME-calculus provides us 
with a homogeneous and systematic characterization of default proofs that leaves room for 
diverse design decisions as regards the ultimate implementation. In fact, a salient feature 
of our approach is that it relies on a local proof procedure employing an incremental 
consistency check. As a result, all inference steps of our DME-calculus are executable 
in a more or less local fashion. This comprises the reduction step, searching among 
ancestor goals, as well as the verification of compatibility for d-extension steps which 
involves inspecting all a-extension literals occurring in the tableau at hand. But even 
though the latter allows for ignoring all default clauses outside the current derivation, 
it has nonetheless a special status due to the involved consistency check. Of course, 
such a consistency check can be mapped, roughly speaking, onto “unsuccessful” ME- 
derivations that yield (ordinary) ME-tableaux comprising at least one open branch. l4 
This would amount to a generalization of Prolog’s “negation-as-failure” mechanism to 
full clause logic. We argue however that such an approach is infeasible due to the 
combinatoric explosion of (repeated) saturations; this gets even worse in the presence 
of disjunctions. Another objection is that we aim at compiling DME-derivations which 
is impractic,able for consistency checking since we deal with dynamically changing sets 
of formulas (cf. Definition 3.4). Moreover, we argue in Section 4 that it is not even 
necessary to continuously perform exhaustive consistency checks, once we can actually 
represent and then eventually reuse the result of a successful consistency check. This 
issue is addressed in Section 4 before we introduce the actual compilation techniques in 
Section 5. 
3.2. Extensions and re$nements 
3.2.1. Lemma handling 
Lemma handling is an important means for eliminating redundancy in automated 
theorem proving (cf. [4]). This task is however more difficult in our context, since proofs 
may depend on default rules and their induced consistency requirements. 
In fact, in classical ME-based calculi, a lemma 1 is simply a set of literals that allows 
for closing each branch containing all elements of I as labels of its nodes. It is well known 
I4 A similar approach was pursued in [79] with a facile decision procedure. 
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that, given two clause sets M and M’ with M’ c M, and a lemma 1 (generated during a 
ME-derivation for M’), then 1 can be applied safely during derivations for M. That is, each 
branch b generated during a derivation for M containing 1 as a subset of the labels of b can 
be marked as closed. 
Unlike this classical approach, it is impossible to simply use such lemmas, like 1, during 
a derivation in default theorem proving. This is because the subrefutation from which 1 
was generated might depend on a set of d-clauses CDS. The use of 1 during a derivation 
employing defaults not consistent with CDS would lead to incorrect results. In the context 
of default theorem proving, we therefore have to extend the concept of lemmas: 
Definition 3.7 (DME-lemma). Let CW be a set of w-clauses, CD be a set of &clauses, and 
let 7 be a tableau generated from some DME-derivation for CW U CD. Let o be some node 
in 7 such that each branch in ‘7 containing o is closed, i.e., there exists a subrefutation 2, 
for o. Further, let 01, . . . , on be the ancestor nodes of o used for reduction steps in D and 
let M C Cw U CD be the set of input clauses used in D. 
Then, clause {h(o), k(ol), . . . , h(~,~)] is called a DME-lemma with respect to M and the 
set of default rules {S 1 {-as, ye} E (CD n M)}. 
Formal underpinnings for this notion can be given by appeal to so-called lemma default 
rules [78]. Restricted to normal default theories, a lemma default rule 61 for a formula 1 
from (D, W), is constructed from a default proof (&)i,~ for 1 in the following way: 
61 = 
: As,E, Conw@) 
1 . 
Since this results in a non-normal default rule, the precise meaning has to be fixed with 
respect to a full-fledged default logic. For full-fledged Reiter’s default logic, it is shown in 
[78] that E is an extension of (D, W) iff E is an extension of (D U {al}, W). 
Our approach is justified by the following result. 
Theorem 3.3. Let Cw be a set of w-clauses and CD be a set of d-clauses such that 
W U Conseq(D) is consistent. Let 1 be a DME-lemma with respect to some subset of 
Cw U CD and some set of default rules D’ G D. Further let I be a tableau generated 
by a DME-derivation from Cw U CD, and let b = (01, . . . , ou, . . . , o,,,) be a branch of 1. 
Lf Ou+l, . . ., o,,, are w-extension-resulting nodes and 1 c {h(o,), . . , h(o,)}, then b can 
be marked as closed (without losing soundness). 
As a corollary to this result, we obtain that soundness is preserved when extending DME- 
derivations with an appropriate Lemma step, which can be given shape as follows. For this, 
let ‘7 = (t, h) and I= {LI , . _ . , L,} be in accord with Theorem 3.3: 
Definition 3.8 (Lemma step). Tableau 7’ is obtained from 7 in the following way. 
l Selectintanopenbranchb=(ol,..., o,, ,..., o,)labeledwithKl,..., K, ,..., K,,,. 
0 If ov+t,...,o~ are w-extension-resulting nodes on b and (Ll , . . . , L, ] E (K,, . . , 
K,,, }, then mark b as closed. 
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The concept of DME-lemmas is further discussed in Section 4, including an illustrative 
example. 1.n particular, we rely on DME-lemmas in Section 4 for communicating 
information from DME-derivations to an attached consistency checker. 
3.2.2. LOO,D checking by blockwise regularity 
Regularity provides a highly efficient means for restricting the search space in ME-based 
theorem proving. It forbids to generate tableaux containing two nodes, 01 and 02 say, on 
the same branch such that 01 and 02 are labeled with the same literal. Using this refinement, 
the number of possible tableaux to be build during a deduction decreases considerably in 
many cases (e.g., see [47,48]). 
Unfortunately, this important refinement for classical ME cannot be applied to Default 
Model Elimination without losing completeness. However, as we will show in the sequel, 
it is possible to adapt regularity to the needs of default reasoning. This leads us to what 
we call blockwise regularity, which requires (i) that no subgoal L1 is equal to one of its 
ancestors 1:~ unless there is a &extension-resulting literal between Lr and L2, and (ii) 
that no two different a-extension resulting nodes on the same branch have ancestor nodes 
labeled with equal literals (in other words, there is no need to construct a branch using two 
&clauses corresponding to defaults with the same consequent). 
In fact, on the pure classical parts of a default proof, blockwise regularity behaves 
exactly like ordinary regularity, whereas in the parts of a derivation involving b-clauses, it 
guarantees that no d-clauses with the same consequent are used for constructing a branch. 
Besides pruning large parts of the search space, blockwise regularity also guarantees 
completeness ince it is necessarily violated by infinite branches. 
The following definition introduces the concept of blocks which is required for a 
formal defjnition of blockwise regularity. Roughly spoken, a block can be considered as a 
“classical” part of a branch; i.e., a block is a part of a branch to which the full (classical) 
regularity restriction can be applied without losing completeness. 
Definition 3.9 (Block). Let 7 be an ME-tableau generated by a DME-derivation for a 
clause set M and let b = (01, . . . , on) be a branch of 7. The sequence oi, . . . , oj (i > 1, 
j < n) is called a block of b iff 
(1) Ok i!; the immediate ancestor of Ok+1 for i < k < j, 
(2) oi is, a a-extension resulting node or was generated by an initialization step, and 
(3) each ok with i < k < j is a w-extension node or a w-extension resulting node. 
Condition (3) asserts simply that the literal attached to ok stems from a w-clause in M. 
For illustration, consider Fig. 4. There, each node of a branch is represented by its label 
except the root node which is indicated by l . The start of a block is marked by typesetting 
the respective literal in boldface. (The purpose of underlining is explained below.) 
Then, blockwise regularity is defined as follows. 
Definition 3.10 (Blockwise regularity). Let 7 be an ME-tableau generated by a DME- 
derivation for a clause set M. 7 is called blockwisely regular iff the following two 
conditions hold. 
(1) Foreachblockot,..., o,ofabranchof7,h(oi)#h(oj)foralll<i<j<n. 
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Fig. 4. Some branches illustrating blockwise regularity. 
(2) For each branch (01, . . . , on) of 7, L@(prev(oi)) # h(prev(oj)) if oi and oj are 
d-extension resulting nodes for 1 6 i < j < n. 
We call a DME-derivation D blockwisely regular iff the tableau generated by D is 
blockwisely regular. 
Condition (2) asserts simply that there are no two literals on one branch which are proved 
by using &clauses stemming from defaults having the same consequent. 
The effect of blockwise regularity can be illustrated by the branches shown in Fig. 4, 
where the nodes characterizing the failure of blockwise regularity are underlined. An 
ME-tableau containing one of the first two branches need not to be considered during a 
deduction, since these two branches violate condition (1) of Definition 3.10. The same 
holds for any ME-tableau containing the third branch since it does not meet condition (2) 
of Definition 3.10. This is because two b-clauses having the same “consequent” Bs, and 
Ba2, respectively, have been used, namely {-As,, Bs, } and { 1 DJ, , BJ, ). Observe that the 
two occurrences of 1 B on the third branch belong to different blocks. Only the rightmost 
branch does not violate any criteria for blockwise regularity. 
The following theorem guarantees that every derivation generating a non-regular tableau 
can be pruned away without losing completeness. 
Theorem 3.4. Let R be a DME-refutation of a clause set M such that the tableau 7 
generated by R is not blockwisely regular: Then, there exists a DME-refutation R’ for 
M such that the tableau I’ generated by R’ is blockwisely regular: 
4. Model-based consistency checking 
This section is devoted to the implementation of incremental consistency checking. 
According to the last section, this amounts to developing a mechanism for verifying 
compatibility of a-extension steps. For this, we start by taking an abstract point of view: 
we presuppose a procedure enumerating DME-derivations, along with a mechanism for 
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finding models of formulas in CNF. The usage of formulas in CNF as opposed to arbitrary 
ones is motivated by the need for continuous modifications (like additions and subsequent 
reductions) to the formulas handed over to the consistency check. These operations can be 
implemented more effectively for formulas in CNF. 
Now, when checking consistency incrementally, and thus, repetitively, we should clearly 
avoid exhau;stive general purpose mechanisms for reducing computational efforts. Our goal 
is therefore to furnish an approach that allows for pruning “inconsistent subproofs” while 
restricting exhaustive consistency checks to the ultimately necessary ones. We address this 
problem by lmeans of a model-based approach: we use a model as a compact representation 
of the consistency of a (partial) default proof. In this way, a model bears witness to 
the compatibility of the involved a-extension steps. The aim is then to reuse such a 
model for as many subsequent compatibility checks as possible. Of course, this reusability 
depends on the chosen model. Hence, we sometimes encounter situations in which we 
have to loolk for a “better” model. We support this search by a potentially synergistic 
treatment of theorem proving and model handling. This approach relies on repeatedly 
reduced clause sets containing the initial facts and the justifications of the applied default 
rules (or to be more precise, the b-extension literals occurring in the current derivation). 
We refer to such clause sets as model-clause-sets because we exploit them as compact 
representations for their underlying set of models. Mutual benefits are then obtainable 
in the following way. First, each time a default rule applies, its justification is added to 
the model-clause-set. That is, for normal default rules, the J-extension literal of each 6- 
extension step is added to this set. In addition, certain lemmas provided by the theorem 
prover are added. Both sorts of added formulas are then used to reduce the model-clause- 
set at hand. Conversely, a theorem prover may also benefit from the semantic account 
provided by a model for the current derivation for governing its proof search. This avenue 
has already proven to be of great value in classical automated theorem proving (cf. [SS]). 
In what follows, however, we concentrate on realizing the two former issues, supporting 
the search for models by transferring information from the theorem prover to the “model 
finder”. 
First of all, let us make precise how we treat consistency checks via model handling: 
for a set of formulas W and a sequence of default rules (Sj)j<i let m be a model for 
W U Conseq((G0, . . . , &_1)). Function V checks whether W U Conseq({So, . . . , Si_l}) if 
-Conseq(&), as stipulated in condition (3) (and Definition 3.4): 
I 
(m, W, (Sj)j<i) if m I= Consed&), 
(m’, W, (6j)j<i) if m k Conseq(Si) and for some 
V(&, (m, W, (Sj)j&)) = 
m' fm 
m’ + W U {COTLSe~(Gj) 1 j <i}, 
I if there is no m” such that 
mN b W U {COKWq(Sj) 1 j <i}. 
Function V gives a general description of our approach while making precise the intuition 
given above. We refine this specification in the sequel. 
The following result shows that V provides a sound and complete specification of the 
consistency condition expressed in condition (3) in Definition 2.1 (and Definition 3.4): 
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Theorem 4.1. Let W be a set offormulas and (Si)i,I a sequence of normal default rules. 
Then, we have for all i E I that if there is a model m of W U Conseq({Go, . . . , &_I}), then 
there is either a model m’ of W U Conseq({Go, . . . , Si}) such that: 
V(&, (m, W, (Sj)j<i)> = (m’, W, (aj)j<i) ifs 
W U Conseq({Go, . ..,6i_l))y-COnSeq(Si) 
or V(6i, (m, W, (Sj)j<i))=-L iff W U Conseq({Go, . . ..Si-l))k ~CO?ZSeq(&). 
Observe that m and m’ need not be distinct; thus covering the first two cases of V. 
At the start of a derivation, m is set to an arbitrary model of the set of premises CW. l5 
From a conceptual point of view, it is actually quite easy to read off such a model from 
the clause set by taking one literal from each clause, while never taking both a literal 
and its negation. Consider the w-clause set CW = {{predispo), [child), {-predispo, -milk, 
allergen)), given in (7). We obtain two models for Cw: {predispo, child, -milk) and 
(predispo, child, -allergen). Note that such models are actually partial models that only 
fix the truth-values of certain literals; hence, they are refineable along their degrees of 
freedom. We rely on this feature in the sequel. 
Whenever a &clause {-as, ys) is selected for a a-extension step in the course of a DME- 
derivation, we check whether JQ is satisfied by the current model m. In our setting, this can 
actually be done by simply checking whether 1~6 $ m, due to the nature of m and ~8. If 
this is the case, ys is added to partial model m. In this way, we enforce that m U (~6) is a 
model for 
'W" {{VS*)3"',{YSi)} u{{YSJ}> (8) 
where ~a,,..., y6i stand for the consequents of the previously used defaults. In DME- 
derivations, these are given by the S-extension literals occurring in the tableau at hand. 
This treatment amounts thus to the compatibility criterion imposed on a-extension steps 
in Definition 3.4. Otherwise, that is if -M E m, a new model for (8) has to be found 
for carrying on with the derivation. If no such model can be provided, S-clause {-CQ, ~6) 
cannot be used in the current situation. 
For reducing computational efforts of searching new models, we consider the afore- 
mentioned model-clause-sets, denoted by M, which are simplified yet equivalent variants 
of clause set (8). Coexisting models and model-clause-sets are therefore invariantly con- 
nected by the satisfiability relation, that is, a considered model always satisfies the current 
model-clause-set. At the start of a DME-derivation the model-clause-set equals CW. Dur- 
ing the DME-derivation it is then extended by the justifications of the used defaults and by 
certain lemmas provided by the theorem prover (see below). The principal idea is then to 
simpliJj, 44 after each such addition. Hence, in case a new model has to be generated, one 
does not have to start with the full clause set in (8) but rather a set which is already cut 
down as much as possible by appeal of previously gathered information. 16, t7 Each such 
l5 Such a model exists since we assume W to be consistent (cf. Footnote 4). 
I6 Notably, such simplifications are doable in an anytime manner. 
I7 Note, however, that in case derivation steps have to be withdrawn, the corresponding modifications of the 
respective model-clause-sets have to be withdrawn, too. 
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simplification has to be model-preserving, i.e., a simplified clause set has to have the same 
partial models as the original one. In all, simplifications reduce the search space for easing 
possible further model generations by eliminating invalid or superfluous ones. In this paper, 
we restrict ourselves to unit-reductions and subsumption-deletion, both of which are well- 
known reduction techniques in automated theorem proving (cf. [23,53]) that can be carried 
out in polynomial time. While unit-reduction allows us to replace a clause {Ll , . . . , L,} 
by{Ll,...,Li-l,Li+l,..., L,] in the presence of some unit clause (LF}, subsumption- 
deletion allows us to remove a clause { Ll , . . . , L,} in the presence of one of its proper 
subsets. In fact, both reductions are essential for Davis-Putnam- (and Resolution-) based 
proof procedures [28], one of which is also a part of our implementation (cf. Section 5). l8 
For illustration, consider another set of statements dealing with nutrition allergies of 
children: “the considered child is usually lively”, “ normally, she is stressed if she is lively 
and must stay at home”, and “normally, she becomes apathetic if she is stressed and 
scratches”. Also, we know that she was at home and that she had sugar or milk. In her 
case, milk causes an allergic reaction, as does sugar under stress. Her allergy makes her 
scratch. This can be represented by the following default theory: 
: lively 
D= livtly’ ( 
lively A home : stress stress A scratch : apathetic 
9 
3 stress apathetic IT 
W = { home, sugar V milk, milk + allergy, stress A sugar -+ allergy, allergy + scratch}. 
For instance, we can explain why the considered child became apathetic via 
( 
: lively lively A home : stress stress A scratch : apathetic 
--, 
lively stress apathetic )- 
The atomic format of our exemplary default theory (D, W) is (D’, W’), where 
(9) 
D’ = 
: lively R : stress Q : apathetic 
lively’ stress ’ apathetic 
, and (10) 
W’ = W U {lively A home -_) R, stress A scratch + Q}. (11) 
Let us illustrate our approach by explaining the child’s apathy, apathetic, from theory 
(D' , W’) by means of a DME-refutation for 
Cwt IJ Cp U {{-apathetic}]. (12) 
Figs. 5-9 give five snapshots of the interplay between DME-derivations and corresponding 
models and model-clause-sets. For brevity, we abbreviate in what follows the propositions 
in (lo/ 11) by their two first letters in capitalized form. 
As initial model of CW/, being the first model-clause-set MO, we take mu = {HO, SU, 
AL, SC, -LI, Q). MO and mu are given on the right of Fig. 5. 
Intuitivel.y, mu is obtained from Mu by taking HO from the first clause in Mu, SU from 
the second, AL from the third, etc. 
Now, we start a DME-derivation by an initialization step with top-clause (YAP}. The 
resulting tableau with open goal -AP is given on the left of Fig. 5. 
l8 An elabomted account on effective methods for simplifying clause sets used in the implementations of the 
Davis-Putnam procedure can be found in [34]. 
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Fig. 5. Snapshot one of the derivation of AP. 
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, { APa, ), 
4 = m U {APJ,I 
= {HO, SU, AL, SC, lLl, Q} U {APb3} 
Fig. 6. Snapshot two of the derivation of AP. 
The second tableau in Fig. 6 emerges by applying four extension steps (one 6- and 
three w-extension steps). Since the first S-extension step uses a-clause {-es, , APs ), 
model-clause-set Ml (the clause set in Fig. 6) contains clause {APs3). (Observe that 
clause [R, -LI, -HO) has been reduced to {R, -LI) by unit-reduction.) Since mo satisfies 
APg, or in other terms, V(63, (mu, W, 0)) equals (mo, W, (83)), we may extend mu to 
rnb = mg U {APs,) and continue with mb. Recall that while V deals with total models, we 
actually account for partial ones by extending them along their degrees of freedom; thus, 
the transition from mg to mb. 
The next S-extension step is applied to subgoal -ST and it uses S-clause {STa,, -&) 
(see the tableau in Fig. 7). Since rn& satisfies ST8, , we may proceed by simply extending rnb 
to rn{ = rnb U [STs,). Furthermore, we add clause (STa*) to Ml and apply unit-reduction 
which gives us model-clause-set M2, the clause set in Fig. 7. 
The following three extension steps are applied to subgoals -RJ~, -LI, and -HO (see 
the tableau in Fig. 8). The second one (a S-extension step) uses S-clause {Lls, ). Notably, rng 
does not satisfy Lla, . Therefore, we have to search for a new model ml of model-clause-set 
M3, which emerges from M2 U { (Lls, )) after the application of unit-reduction. Note that 
due to the rigorous application of unit-reductions, M3 comprises merely 25 = 32 potential 
models, as opposed to 23 x 33 = 216 in the case of Cwl. Formally, we get 
V(&, (mi, w9 (63,62))) = (ml, w, (83,82, &)), 
with m 1 = {HO, SU, AL, SC, R, Q, APs, , STs,, Lls, ). 
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. { Lb, 
ml = {HO,SU,AL,SC,R,Q,AP6,,ST62,Lldl} 
Fig. 8. Snapshot four of the derivation of AP. 
Now, the DME-derivation has reached a point where four subgoals, namely -LI, -HO, 
- RJ,, and -ST, are proven. According to Definition 3.7, we have that: 
l {-HO} is a DME-lemma with respect to {(HO}} and the empty set of defaults, 
l {-LI] is a DME-lemma with respect to {(Lls]}} and {Sl}, 
l {-Rs2} is a DME-lemma with respect to [{HO}, (Llsl }, (R, -LI, -HO}} and (al), and 
l (-ST} is a DME-lemma with respect to ((HO}, ILlsI}, (R, -LI, -HO], (STs,, -Ral}} 
and I’%, 821. 
In other words, we have shown that each open branch of a tableau generated by a DME- 
derivation from 
(13) 
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Fig. 9. Snapshot five of the derivation of AP. 
can be marked as closed, if it contains one of -tLI, -HO, 7Ra2, or -ST. 
It is important to realize that this information can be exploited for reducing even more 
the number of potential models in a model-clause-set. This is because each partial model 
found in, for instance, Ma is also one in (13), l9 or, in the other way round, each set of lit- 
erals being no model of (13) cannot be a model of M3, either. Formally, we can capture this 
idea by the concept of DME-lemmas, as introduced in Section 3.2.1: for a DME-lemma 1 
generated from some DME-derivation for a clause set M, no partial model in M contain- 
ing 1 as a subset has to be considered while searching for a model of M. This is because 
each DME-derivation can be considered as a classical ME-derivation (see the considera- 
tions after Theorem 3.2). Hence, the generation of a DME-lemma I from some clause set 
A4 implies that -E is entailed by M. As a consequence, each potential model containing 1 
as a subset must be invalid and can be ignored. 
For simplification issues, so-called unit lemmas consisting of singleton sets of literals 
are of particular interest. In fact, after generating such a DME-lemma {L}, the clause {lL} 
can be added to the respective model-clause-set and used for simplification. Other (non- 
unit) default lemmas can be used as a kind of constraints: while searching for a model in a 
model-clause-set, one can skip every potential model containing a DME-lemma as a sub- 
set. Moreover, there is no need for a consistency check, since all of these lemmas are drawn 
relative to default rules belonging to the current default proof. We discuss such so-called 
dynamic lemmas in Section 5.2.1. 
Turning back to our running example, we could now take advantage of the generated 
DME-lemmas [ -LI), {-HO), I-R} and {-ST}. However, M3 already contains the cor- 
responding (negated) unit clauses and therefore these particular DME-lemmas cannot be 
lg This is because (i) each model-clause-set contains C W, (in a simplified form), and (ii) whenever a S-clause is 
used in a derivation, a subset of it is added to the respective model-clause-set. 
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used for further simplifications of M3. Nevertheless, there are situations where the ex- 
ploitation of DME-lemmas can be useful. Such a situation is given after the following 
three inference steps illustrated by the tableau in Fig. 9 (note that these steps do not use 
&clauses). The reader may verify that now subgoals -AL and +.C are proven; hence we 
can add the corresponding negated unit clauses to M3 (note that we do not have to extend 
ml since it iah-eady contains AL and SC). In particular, -AL turns out to provide a useful 
DME-lemma since adding the resulting unit clause {AL) to Ms allows for two subsequent 
unit- and one subsumption-reductions. The resulting model-clause-set M4 is the one in 
Fig. 9. Obviously, a new model (which is not needed in our example) could now be found 
with almost no efforts. 
Finally, the sole remaining subgoal which has not been treated so far, viz. -ST, can be 
proven via the previously generated DME-lemma {-ST}. 
In all, we: have thus shown that there exists a DME-refutation for clause set (12) with 
top clause {-AP). The compatibility of the three involved a-extension steps was warranted 
by models mu (mb/m$ and ml. We have thus shown that AP can be explained by means 
of default proof (9) from (D’, W’). 
Apart from the reuse of models as compact representations of previous consistency 
checks, the last example puts emphasis on simplifications of the model-clause-set. In fact, 
such simplifications are doable in an anytime manner. And only the addition of lemmas 
depending on default assumptions are subject to backtracking (since classical lemmata can 
be used independently from the set of li-clauses used in a derivation). This leaves room for 
different implementation strategies. One extreme is to trigger simplifications on each item 
added to the model-clause-set (as shown above to put forward the approach in principle). 
Another altlemative is to do this by need, that is, only if enforced by a search for a new 
model. The first moulding is arguably very appealing in a parallel setting, since then the 
anytime property allows for continued simplifications without putting brakes on the actual 
inference engine. In a purely sequential setting, as ours, however, the second variant seems 
more appropriate, since the simplification efforts, though polynomial, are restricted to the 
ultimately necessary ones. This is why we have chosen the latter option for implementing 
our model-based approach to consistency checking, as shown in the next section. 
5. Implementing query answering from default theories 
The key observation that led to the results reported in this section is that the approach 
for query answering presented in the previous sections allows us to apply Prolog technol- 
ogy in a rather straightforward manner. This is due to the fact that model elimination is 
closely related to Prolog’s linear input resolution [53], which renders it especially qualified 
for implementation by means of so-called Prolog Technology Theorem Provers (PTTPs) 
[86-883. As regards classical theorem proving, this approach has already resulted in quite 
impressive high-performance proof systems, like [9,41,86]. The main reason for their con- 
vincing performance is their ability to take advantage of highly efficient underlying Prolog 
systems (or similar systems based on the Warren Abstract Machine [l]). 
In what follows, we describe how Prolog technology can be used for implementing de- 
fault reasoning systems. As regards classical theorem proving, we follow the approach 
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taken by Stickel’s PTTP [87,88]. PTTP can be seen as an extension of Prolog that pro- 
vides a proof system for full first-order predicate calculus. In order to attain this, one has to 
enhance Prolog via measures guaranteeing (i) sound unification, (ii) complete search, and 
(iii) complete inference. In what follows, we concentrate on the last item, since we have 
restricted our exposition to the propositional case. In fact, there is no need for modifying 
the classical methods addressing the first two issues when dealing with default reasoning, 
so that we refer the reader for details to [87]. 
5.1. Implementation by an extended Prolog compiler 
The standard approach is based on the idea to transform a theory W along with a query 
q into a Prolog program Pw and a Prolog query Qp such that QV is derivable from PW iff 
W A -IJYJ is unsatisfiable. In this way, the Prolog inference mechanism remains unchanged, 
while the transformation has to guarantee the implementation of items (i)-(iii). Although 
this approach is conceptually very simple it has proven to be very successful. 
The first step of Stickel’s transformation is a direct translation of a given set of input 
clauses into a set of Prolog rules. Since a Prolog rule a : - b can be read as an impli- 
cation a t b, a first idea would be to transform a clause like (a, -6) into such a Pro- 
log rule. More generally, a clause {Ll , . . . , L,} can be transformed into an implication 
Li t LE A ’ ’ ’ A Lf_1 A LF+;1 A . . . A Lh, which is referred to as a contrapositive of the 
original clause. 2o However, in order to guarantee completeness of reasoning by contrapo- 
sition, one has to generate a Prolog rule for each contrapositive of a clause at hand. Our 
exemplary clause {a, -b} results thus in two contrapositives a t b and -b t -a. 
For further illustration, consider the classical formulas in (4). While child and predispo 
are turned into a single contrapositive child t and predispo t, respectively, we 
obtain three contrapositives from {-milk, -predispo, allergen}, namely allergen t milk A 
predispo, -milk t -allergen A predispo, and -predispo t -allergen A milk. Following 
PTTP’s translation schema [87], this amounts to the following Prolog rules: 21 
child. 
predispo . 
allergen :- milk, predispo. 
not-milk :- not-allergen, predispo. 
not_predispo :- not-allergen, milk. 
We refer to such rules as o-rules. Prolog’s treatment of each w-rule corresponds to an w- 
extension step using the original clause as input clause, while closing the branch labeled 
with the head literal. For a set containing n clauses whose maximal cardinality is m, we 
thus obtain at most 12 x m w-rules. 
Taking into account that Prolog’s inference rule corresponds to the classical ME- 
extension step, one obviously has to provide additional means for complete inference (i.e., 
means for reasoning by cases). This is actually accomplished by extending the translation 
in order to integrate reduction steps (see Section 3.1). Following P’ITP’s translation schema 
2o Taking commutativity of A into account, a clause consisting of n literals has thus n contrapositives. 
21 Following F’ITP’s syntax, allergen and not-allergen stand for allergen and -allergen etc. 
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[87], this is achieved in following way. First, one has to memorize ancestors goals by 
adding an additional argument (a list tic) to each literal (see left column below). We 
refer to this list as the ancestor list. Second, for each literal that is added in some rule to 
the ancestor list (like allergen or not-milk below) a further rule must be added in 
order to allow for testing whether a subsequent subgoal is complementary to this (possibly 
memorized) literal. These additional rules are given in the right column below. 22 In our 
example, we thus get the following rules. 
chil’d (Ant) . 
predispo (Ant) . 
allergen(Anc) :- not_allergen(Anc) :- 
KewAnc = [allergenlAncl, member(allergen,Anc). 
milk(NewAnc) , 
predispo(NewAnc). 
notLmilk(Anc) :- milk(Anc) :- 
NewAnc = [not_milklAnc], member(not_milk,Anc) . 
rot_allergen(NewAnc) , 
predispo(NewAnc). 
not_predispo(Anc) :- predispo(Anc) :- 
NewAnc = [not_predispolAnc], member(not_predispo, 
not_allergen(NewAnc), AT-K) . 
milk(NewAnc) . 
For a clause set over an alphabet counting I letters, we thus obtain at most 2 x 1 additional 
Prolog rules. As shown in [88], the aforementioned compile time transformations provide 
a proof system for propositional clause logic. (For brevity, we refrain from adding Prolog 
rules implementing regularity checks and lemma handling, as discussed in Section 3.2. We 
address these issues separately in Section 5.2.) 
Let us now turn to the transformations needed for integrating default rules. We have seen 
in Section 3.1, how a classical ME-based calculus can be adapted for default reasoning, 
namely (i) by adding a restricted extension step for b-clauses and (ii) by restricting the 
classical definition of reduction steps. In what follows, we advance PTTP’s translation 
schema further in order to incorporate these two enhancements. 
As pointed out in Section 3.1, the definition of J-extension steps reflects the fact that 
defaults are inference rules by demanding that only literals corresponding to consequents 
of defaults ;are used as d-extension literals. This is actually what distinguishes them from 
conventional w-extension steps. 23 By taking this difference into account, we may thus 
treat S-clauses and o-clauses in an analogous way. In fact, the translation of a &clause 
{YCQ, ys} equals that of a w-clause, except that only one of its contrapositives is considered 
for transformation, namely ya t ~8. This yields a single Prolog rule yd : - as. The 
22 For further examples, take any second Prolog rule of any procedure in Fig. A.2. 
23 Note that we are not yet talking of compatible S-extension steps at this stage. 
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restriction to a single contrapositive renders reason by contraposition ineffective because 
it refuses inferences with &clauses like {-as, ~8) to solve an open goal like CQ (thus 
preserving 6’s inference rule character). We refer to the resulting Prolog rules as S-rules 
and sometimes abbreviate a S-rule stemming from a default 5‘ by rc . In our example, we 
obtain for the default rules in (4) the following Prolog rules: 
icecream :- child. 
milk :- icecream. 
sugar :- icecream. 
In analogy to o-rules, each such &rule describes a possible transition between two tableaux 
by means of a S-extension step using the underlying default rule. For a clause set containing 
d &clauses, we thus obtain at most d &rules. 
As with ordinary clauses, we have to provide means for applying reduction steps. As 
above, we add an additional argument memorizing ancestor subgoals. But instead of 
extending the resulting list by the head literal ~8 of the considered b-rule, the ancestor 
list is set to the empty list for avoiding reduction steps using ancestor subgoals of ~8. In 
this way, the resulting Prolog program implements the restriction of classical reduction 







The next step in our transformation provides means for checking consistency by 
guaranteeing compatibility for b-extension steps. We have seen in Section 4 that a single 
(partial) model m can be used as a compact representation of the consistency of a default 
proof. For implementing this model-based approach to consistency checking, we add a 
further argument to each generated Prolog rule, containing among others a (partial) model 
mforCwU{{yj}Ij<i}providedthat?I-rtdesrs,,..., t-s,_, have been successfully applied 
in the derivation up to this point. In this way, m guarantees that all d-extension steps 
effectuated via b-rules r-6,) . . . , r6r_1 have preserved compatibility. 
When testing compatibility at d-rule rs, , we check whether yai is satisfied by m. (Note 
that such a satisfiability test is linear in the size of ysi .) If this easy test succeeds, we 
continue by extending partial model m in order to account for ysi. If not, we try to generate 
a new model m’ satisfying 
CWU{{YSj} lj <i}u{(YSil}. (14) 
If this succeeds, we continue proving with m’. Otherwise, backtracking is engaged. This 
proceeding guards the compatible application of subsequent &extension steps according 
to the specification of function V given in Section 4. 
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However, in order to be able to generate new models for dynamically increasing and 
decreasing clause sets of form (14), we need an extremely flexible representation for the 
corresponding model-clause-sets. This is why we have chosen to propagate model-clause- 
sets along with the current model throughout the ongoing derivation instead of compiling 
them into rigid Prolog code. 
As a consequence, function V is implemented by the run-time predicate compa t i - 
ble / 3, which-as its name suggests-verifies whether a J-extension step with d-rule rsi 
is compatib1.e or not. The first argument comprises the justification of & given by ysi. 24 
While the second argument encapsulates the current model m along with the current model- 
clause-set, the third argument contains the same information, yet enriched by the informa- 
tion gathered after a successful application of Q . In case of failure, that is if m b 1~6, and 
no new model m’ of (14) can be found from the model-clause-set, predicate compati- 
ble/ 3 fails, and backtracking is engaged. 
In all, we thus need two physical variables (M and NewM) for propagating models and 
two physical variables (MM and NewMM) for propagating model-clause-sets throughout a 
derivation. 13ecause of the tight relationship between models and model-clause-sets, we 






i.cecream( [I ,m(M,MM) ,m(Ml,MMl)), 
c~ompatible(milk,m(M1,MMl),m(NewM,NewMM)). 
sugar(Anc,m(M,MYM),m(NewM,NewMM)) :- 
i.cecream( [] ,m(M,MM) ,m(Ml,MMl)), 
compatible(sugar,m(Ml,MMl) ,m(NewM,NewMM) ) . 
Observe that pairs like m (M, MM) correspond to those used in Figs. 5-9, like for instance 
rng and M:! or ml and M3. 
Notably, our implementation allows us to decide at compile time whether we check 
compatibility before or after finding a proof of the original prerequisite. From a &rule 
ya t CQ we may thus generate one of the following Prolog rules depending on whether we 
choose, say, compiler option u-corn or corn-a: 
(a-ccm) ys :- a8, compatible (ys) 
(corn-a) ya : - compatible (~a), ayg .
Under option o-corn, Prolog tries to find a proof of the prerequisite cxg before checking 
compatibility of ~6, whereas under corn-a compatibility is checked first. 
24 Actually, o~ur implemented system deals with default components in negation normal form. Consequently, the 
first argument Icontains the CNF of the justification. See also Section 5.2.4. 
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Turning back to our example, the first of the above Prolog rules is replaced under corn-o 
by 
icecream(Anc,m(M,MM),m(NewM,NewMM)) :- 
compatible(icecream,m(M,MM) ,m(Ml,MMl) ) , 
child([l,m(Ml,MMl),m(NewM,NewMM)). 
(1% 
A detailed empirical analysis of both options is given in Section 5.3. We just report here 
that a preceding verification of compatibility (corn-o) turns out to be extremely valuable 
for pruning the search space in knowledge bases comprising a high number of potential 
conflicts. For instance, for deciding Hamiltonian cycle problems, this compiler option leads 
to much better results than a belated compatibility check (a-corn). The inverse can be 
observed, for example, on terminological knowledge bases, where the search is more or 
less guided by classical inferencing. 25 
From a schematic perspective, predicate compatible/ 3 can be defined in our 





compatible(K,m(M,MM) ,m(NewM,NewMM) ) :- 
negated_literal(K,NOT_K), 
member (NOT-K, 1’4) , 
reduced_clause_set( [ [KlIMMl,NewMM), 
model (NewMM, NewM) . 
(Run-time predicate negated_li teral (X, Y) is true if Y is bound to the negation of 
X. Run-time predicate member / 2 implements the common membership-relation. Clause 
sets are represented by lists of lists of literals.) 
To begin with, we observe that the combination of variable K and term m (M, MM) 
amounts to the information passed to function V in Section 4 via V(6, (m, W, (Sj)j,J)). 
While K stands for the justification ye of 6 (i.e., Conseq(G) = ya), M and MM represent 
the current model m along with the current model-clause-set M providing a compact 
representation of W U (Conseq(Sj) I j E .I). This is sufficient because V deals only with 
the justifications (or consequents, respectively) of the considered (normal) default rules. 
The first clause handles the case where K is satisfied by model M. In our simplistic setting, 
this can be tested by 1~s $ m, expressed by not member (NOT-K, M) . In addition, 
model-clause-set MM is extended by unit clause [ Kl and afterwards reduced by run- 
time predicate reduced_clause_set /2 (involving unit-reductions and subsumption- 
25 In fact, the gain in the latter case is not that drastic as in the former case; on the other hand, the inherent 
complexity of the problem set is also decreasing. 
26 This involves (i) one literal justifications (due to atomic format) as opposed to general ones in conjunctive 
normal form, (ii) closed formulas as justifications; these restrictions are unleashed in our system. See [59] for 
details. 
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deletions, as described in Section 4). Finally, ys is added to m (neglecting multiple 
occurrences’) through Prolog’s head matching. In case 1~s E m, the second Prolog clause 
steps in: a new model NewM is computed via run-time predicate model / 2 from model- 
clause-set NewMM, which results from [Kl and MM by applying the same reductions as in 
the first clause. 
This proc:eeding is in accord with our principled approach allowing for continuous 
simplifications of the model-clause-set. As anticipated at the end of Section 4, we actually 
pursue a more pragmatic approach in our (current) implementation that simplifies only by 
need. Thus, no simplification is done whenever a model is reusable, as in the first case. 
This yields the following alternative pattern for the first clause: 
compatible(K,m(M,MM) ,m( [KIM], [ [Kl ]MMl) ) :- 
negated-literal (K,NOT_K) , 
not member (NOT_K,M) . 
This pragmatic solution is justified by the fact that we observe on many examples rather 
few model s,witches. Investigations with a profiler showed that in such cases considerable 
CPU-time is consumed by simplification procedures. 
For finding new models (via run-time predicate model / 2), we use an adapted variant of 
the Davis-Putnam procedure [28], which is currently one of the fastest complete methods 
for finding propositional models. Importantly, this task is supported by repeated reductions 
of the model-clause-set by using information gathered during the proof search. This may 
lead to a drastic reduction of the search space for finding new models, as illustrated in 
Section 4. Further implementation-based impr.ovements are detailed in [21] (see also [83]). 
The propagation of models and model-clause-sets affects also the Prolog rules stemming 





















The above material provides a (simplified) recipe for transforming a default theory 
(D, W) into a Prolog program PD,~. For query answering, however, we have to provide 
a further transformation for queries, like (p. Following PTTP, we use for this purpose a 
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Number Purpose Source 
nxm w-rules 





1 query rule 
> cp 
(nxm)+(2xZ)+d+l W+D+cp 
Fig. 10. Estimated size of the Prolog code resulting from the basic compilation techniques. 
special predicate query along with a Prolog rule of the form query : - (p. Basically, 
the application of this rule is similar to an initialization step in DME-derivations. For our 
treatment of consistency, however, it has to be enriched by run-time predicate model / 2 
which generates an initial model of C w . Furthermore, the rule has to initialize the ancestor 
list (which is set to the empty list) and to propagate the model generated by model /2. 
In our example (with query allergen), we thus get schematically the following Prolog 
rule, where C-W represents a reduced variant of Cw : 
query :- 
model (C_W,M) , 
allersen([l,m(M,C_W),m(_,_)). 
(16) 
This rule allows us to pose our initial query allergen via Prolog query ?-query. 
In all, we thus compile a default theory (D, W) along with a query p into a Prolog 
program PD,w,~ = PD,W U {(16)} along with a Prolog query query. The resulting 
program is compilable using a standard Prolog compiler which leads to its impressive 
performance. Subsequent queries are easily posed by replacing and recompiling the single 
query rule only. 
Finally, let us give an estimate on the number of resulting Prolog rules obtained from the 
compilation of an atomic default theory (D, W) along with query IJJ over alphabet _K’. Let 
CW contain 12 clauses whose maximal cardinality is m, let Z: count 1 propositional symbols 
and let D be of cardinality d. The estimate of the resulting code is summarized in Fig. 10. 
We refine this first estimate in Section 5.2.6, where we incorporate further rules stemming 
from refinements of our approach. 
For an impression, consult Appendix A containing some examples treated in this paper 
along with the resulting “object-code”. 
5.2. Extensions, refinements and implementation 
The previous section has presented our basic approach to implementing default 
reasoning by taking advantage of the power provided by P’MP Our current implementation 
refines this basic approach in several ways in order to improve its flexibility and efficiency. 
This section summarizes the most important improvements. 
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5.2.1. Lemma handling 
We have already stressed in Section 3.2.1, the importance of lemma handling as a means 
for eliminating redundancy in automated theorem proving. We have also seen that this task 
is more difficult in our context, since proofs may depend on default rules. 
We can a.ctually distinguish between two independent subtasks for lemma handling: 
generation and usage of lemmas: 
For generating lemmas, we must have knowledge on the subderivations used for 
deriving them. This is because we must know (i) which subgoals have been solved by 
reduction stleps using ancestor goals outside the considered subderivation and (ii) which 
consistency assumptions have been made during A-extension steps. This requires recording 
the subderivations for each proposition to be lemmatized. This is done by means of PTTP’s 
proof recording facilities, used in standard PTTP for recording the (overall) proof of the 
query. For this purpose, further arguments must be added to each Prolog predicate in order 
to account for subderivations; this is complemented by further runtime Prolog code for 
extracting the relevant information from these subderivations. 
Lemma generation is then accomplished by passing a proven subgoal along with infor- 
mation gathered from its subderivation to a predicate 1 emma t i z e, which encapsulates 
the actual lemmatization proceeding. Concretely, we add lemma generation to Prolog rules 
by simply attaching predicate 1 emma t i z e to the end of the rules’ bodies. At this location 
of a rule’s body, we are in possession of the entire subderivation, since all subgoals have 
been proven.. 
For example, in the case of the Prolog rule headed by allergen, we obtain without 





For propagating subderivations, allergen, milk, and predispo are then extended 
by two additional variables whose outcome is then passed to lemmatize (allergen) 
by extending it appropriately. (The entire rule is then of course subject to further 
compilations.) Note that lemma generation does thus not add entire rules to the resulting 
Prolog code, but rather a single subgoal for each proposition to be lemmatized. 
This last subgoal, being composed in its final form of predicate 1 emma t i z e, the actual 
lemma, and. its proof, does the aforementioned subproof analysis and then dumps the 
generated lemma along with the information extracted from its proof into the Prolog 
database (by means of Prolog’s standard predicate assert/l), so that it becomes 
available for later usage. The dumped items have the following format: 
lemrrla(Goal,Ancestors,Assumptions). (17) 
This signifies that Goal has been proven by means of reductions with ancestor goals 
Ancestors under consistency assumptions Assumptions. The lemma itself is then 
given by the disjunction of Goal and all literals in Ancestors. That is in terms of 
Section 3.2, a lemma item such as lemma(L, (Ll , . . . , L,}, {& , . . . , /?A~}) represents a 
DME-lemma{L,Lt,..., L,} with respect to the set of default rules {St, . . . , 8k}. 
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For using lemmas, we simply add terminating Prolog rules in front of each Prolog 
procedure. For resolving allergen via lemma usage, for example, we thus add 
schematically a Prolog rule 
allergen :- 
lemma (allergen) . 
at the top of procedure allergen. 
For the most part, predicate lemma looks up the Prolog database for corresponding 
lemmas; it actually matches in its final form with the lemma items given in (17). Once such 
an item is retrieved, we must (usually 27 ) take into account the consistency requirements 
attached to the stored lemma; this is done via model handling, as described in Sections 4 




compatible(Assumptions,m(M,MM) ,m(NewM,NewMM) ) . 
As above, the entire rule is then subject to further compilations. Among them, those 
dealing with disjunctive lemmas, addressed by checking whether the ancestor goals in 
Ancestors form a subset of those in ~nc. 29 
In all, this feature adds at most 2 x I additional Prolog rules, where 1 is the size of the 
underlying alphabet. 
In our current implementation, we particularly take care of the fact that using lemma 
mechanisms in an unrestricted fashion leads to the generation of a flood of useless lemmas 
swamping the storage. To this end, we employ techniques which have their roots in 
successful approaches to restrict lemma usage in classical theorem proving. 
First, we actually distinguish between static and dynamic lemmas (cf. [51]). 
Dynamic lemmas are temporary lemmas that disappear through backtracking: whenever 
a lemma is derived during a deduction (via some subderivation), it can be used in 
subsequent derivation steps but expires as soon as its own subderivation is tracked back. 
Hence, the number of available dynamic lemmas is limited by the number of proved 
subgoals in the tableau under consideration. Notably, the consistent use of such lemmas is 
warranted by the presence of its (compatible) subderivation. Thus, valid dynamic lemmas 
are usable without any consistency checks. 3o For dynamic lemma handling the last Prolog 
rule can thus be replaced by the following one: 
allergen(Anc,MMM,MMM) :- 
lemma(allergen,Ancestors,_). 
27 This applies to static lemmas only; see below for further details. 
*’ Anticipating the treatment of general default rules in Section 5.2.4, Assumptions represents actually a 
clause set. 
29 While our actual implementation allows for generating disjunctive lemmas, we do actually never use them. 
We rather concentrate on unit lemmas, whose usage is much more effective. See below. 
3o Hence the application of a dynamic lemma has never to be tracked back (see Section 5.2.3). 
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Experiments have shown that the use of dynamic lemmas may result in a significant speed- 
up, while they practically never harm the proof search due to their restricted viability. This 
is illustrated in Section 5.3. The use of dynamic lemmas is actually related to a technique 
used for classical ME-based theorem proving, namely the (highly effective) folding-up 
technique [48] (or C-reduction [84]). 
As opposed to this, static lemmas are kept along with their underlying consistency 
assumptions throughout a whole deduction; this requires verifying compatibility each time 
such a lemma is used. These lemmas have thus to be dealt with carefully, since they may 
lead to the aforementioned flood of useless lemmas swamping the storage. 
Second, our implementation allows to restrict the generation of lemmas to so-called 
unit lemmas, which consist of one literal only. Due to the fact that the application of unit 
lemmas does not depend on the existence of suitable ancestor goals, such lemmas are 
clearly more effective than ordinary ones. Furthermore, their application (in particular if 
dynamic lemmas are considered) can be checked very efficiently (with a simple lookup 




In the field of classical theorem proving, unit lemmas have shown to be inevitable for 
strengthening the deductive power of ME-based proof systems (e.g., see [ 141). 
5.2.2. Loop checking by blockwise regularity 
As described in Section 3.2.2, regularity provides a highly efficient means for discarding 
subgoals identical to one of their ancestor subgoals in proof systems based on model 
elimination. 
As with Ilemmas, we had to adapt this tool for default reasoning. This led us in 
Section 3.2:2 to what we called blockwise regularity requiring (i) that each block of a 
branch must not contain two identical literals and (ii) that every branch must not contain 
two identical literals to which a S-extension step has been applied. 
Both conditions can be easily implemented via ancestor lists (as already put forward in 
[87] for classical regularity). For verifying condition (i) we make use of the fact that the 
literals of a block are exactly the literals which can be used for reduction steps. Hence, 
we simply put in front of each Prolog procedure a further terminating Prolog rule clause 
that checks whether the ancestor list memorizing potential candidates for reduction steps 
contain two identical literals. For instance, 
allergen (Ant) : - 
member(allergen,Anc), 
!,fail. 
is put in front of the procedure allergen. For further examples, take any first Prolog rule 
of any procedure in Fig. A.2. 
For verifying condition (ii), we have to check that after using a S-rule ye : - ag , no b-rule 
with head ys is used to prove ~6. To this end, we must actually add another list memorizing 
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the ancestors of b-extension resulting literals, and provide further clauses (similar to the 
ones for checking condition (i)) which prevent derivations violating condition (ii). 
As with implementing reduction or lemma steps, this feature adds at most 2 x 1 
additional Prolog rules, where 1 is the size of the alphabet. 
5.2.3. Avoiding useless backtracking 
For propositional clauses it is well known that reduction steps and extension steps with 
unit clauses need not to be tracked back. That is, if it is possible to apply such a derivation 
step to some open goal G in a tableau 7, one does not have to check derivations that apply 
another derivation step to G. The same holds for the application of dynamic lemmas: if a 
branch with open goal G in a tableau ‘7 can be marked as closed due to the application of 
a dynamic lemma, there is no need to check any other derivation that applies a reduction 
or extension step to G in 7. This is because a dynamic lemma 1 can only be applied to a 
tableau 7 whose corresponding derivation contains for each b-rule r, used in the derivation 
of 1, at least one S-extension step with r. Hence, the application of E to 7 cannot restrict 
the application of further &extension steps. 
Fortunately, both enhancements are easily implementable using Prolog’s cut: one only 
has to guarantee that (i) the Prolog-clauses implementing reduction steps, extension steps 
with unit clauses, and lemma usage are put in front of the Prolog clauses implementing 
extension steps, and (ii) that each of these clauses ends with “ ! . “. 
5.2.4. General default rules 
For simplicity, our presentation was so far dominated by default rules having atomic 
components only. As PTTP, however, our implementation deals with formulas in negation 




To begin with, note that translating this rule into its atomic format yields 
os4’ ’ I’642 along with (A A (1B v C)) + a~~,, ys42 + -D v E, /3642 + -D v E, 
y642 
where ~42, B&42 and y642 are new atoms. The obtained atomic default rule is then 
transformed into the single contrapositive ( ys42 t CQ,,), which is itself turned into d-rule 
gamma(42) :- alpha(42). 
This d-rule is now furthermore used for handling the information provided by 
Bs42 -+ -D v E. This is motivated by the fact that implications of form & + 
JUstif concern the consistency check only. These rules are therefore not transformed 
themselves but rather woven into the S-rule stemming from the atomic default rule. 
This is accomplished by wrapping the justification Justif(6i) into the (intermediate) term 
justif ication (Justif( and adding the latter to the body of the d-rule. 




justification (Justif( . 
(18) 
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Among the further compilation steps, the term formed by means of j us t i f i ca t i on / 1 
is tumedinto a call to procedure compatible/3 (see below). 
Although the two remaining implications, viz. (A A (-B v C)) + a!gd2 and y642 + 
-D v E, can now be treated as ordinary w-clauses, we make use of the fact that aa42 
and y6/s42 are new atoms occurring at particular places only: for instance, normally, o- 
clause { -yg,, , -D, E) would give rise to three contrapositives (1~6~~ t D A -E), 
(-D t ysd2 A -E), and (E t yad2 A D). The first contrapositive is however redundant, 
since there is never any rule having -vs,, among its body literals. Generally, we may thus 
leave out all contrapositives with head -ysi that are obtained from ysi + Conseq(&). 
A similar argument shows that we may eliminate all contrapositives, having -a!gi among 
their body literals, because there are no rules with head -CQ. Since PTTP supports 
furthermore rule-bodies in negation normal form, we obtain in our example directly the 
contrapositive ((118~~ t A A (-B v C)). In general, we thus get for any default & a single 
w-rule having alpha ( i ) as head and (the negation normal form of) Prereq(&) as body: 
alpha (i ) : - 
Prereq(6~). 
See below for the w-rule obtained in our example. 
In all, this proceeding results in d-rules sharing the syntactical format given in (18), 
while the a’riginal constituents of the default rules are pushed into w-rules that are then 
treated in the classical way by means of standard HTTP-techniques. 
In concrete terms, our system generates for the above default rule the following 
(intermedia.te) Prolog code: 
not__d : - 
:lot_e, 
lgamma(42). 




<alpha (42) , 
justification([[not_d, ell). 
alpha ( 42 ) : - 
‘3. I 
(not-b ; c). 
From the perspective of default rule 
AAI:-BvC): -DvE 
-DvE ’ 
the first two rules tell us intuitively that we can use its consequent -D v E if we can 
“apply” the default rule, indicated by gamma. That is, we can prove -D if we can prove 
-E and gamma; and we can prove E if we can prove D and gamma. Analogously, the last 
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rule accounts for proving the prerequisite. Only the third Prolog rule must subsequently 
receive special treatment as a d-rule; all others are treated by standard P’ITP-techniques. 
The body of the S-rule comprises the term structure justif ication ( [ [not-d, 
el I ) containing the clausal representation {I-D, E}} of the default rule’s justification. 
As mentioned above, this term is later on turned into a subgoal using run-time predicate 
compatible/3. The actual implementation of compatible/3 does thus not rely 
on a membership test, as put forward in the simplistic setting in Section 5, but rather a 
satisfiability test taking a partial model along with a clause set as arguments. Recall that 
such a test is linear in the size of the clause set. We refer the interested reader to [59] (or 
even [83]) for further implementation details. 
In view of these details, we can estimate the number of Prolog rules stemming from 
default rules in the non-atomic case: assuming that all prerequisites and consequents have 
at most m literals, we thus obtain for a default theory including d default rules, (m x d) 
w-rules (for each default, at most (m - 1) with ys in the body and 1 with ~!g as head) and 
d b-rules (for each default, one &rule). 
5.2.5. Variables over afinite universe 
Finally, a word on our treatment of variables. As mentioned in the introductory 
section, our current implementation treats variables over a finite Herbrand universe 
in the rudimentary sense that a formula or a rule, respectively, is regarded as the 
representative of all its ground instances; thus, skolemization is not considered. Although 
this boils down to propositional logic, too, it allows for expressing things more concisely. 
This is implemented by a technique known from automated theorem proving and 
deductive databases that makes Prolog rules range-restricted by inserting unary predicates 
enumerating the Herbrand universe for unbound variables violating range-restrictedness 
[22]. In this way, during an inference, every unbound variable of an open goal is bound 
to a ground term (furnished by the unary predicate). This allows us to handle variables 
occurring in default rules by Prolog variables and so to avoid the generation of ground 
instances. 31 The only particular restriction we impose concerns default rules: variables in 
justifications must occur either in the corresponding prerequisite or consequent. 
5.2.6. Intermediate Prolog code 
We have already given an estimate on the number of resulting Prolog rules obtained in 
the basic setting. Let us now make this more precise in the light of the refinements and 
further details discussed above. Consider a default theory (D, W) along with query p over 
an alphabet E counting 1 propositional symbols. Let W contain n formulas in negation 
normal form and let D contain d default rules, all of whose constituents are in negation 
normal form. Let m be the maximal number of literals occurring in a formula of W or as 
constituent of a default rule. The resulting estimate is given in Fig. 11. 
As an example, consider our initial default theory (4). With I = 6, n = 3, m = 3, d = 3, 
we get 60 Prolog clauses, as a worst case estimate. Without lemma handling, this reduces 
to 48 Prolog clauses. This has to be contrasted with the actual number of Prolog rules 
31 A sort-oriented insertion of ground terms is currently implemented. 
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Number Purpose 
nxm w-rules 
2x1 reduction rules 
2x1 regularity rules 
2x1 lemma rules I 
d &rules 
dxm w-rules 
1 regularity rule (gamma) 
1 lemma rule (gamma) I 






((n + d) x m) + d + (6 x I) + 3 W+D+cp 
Fig. 11. Estimated size of the Prolog code resulting from the actual compilation techniques (including lemma 
handling and blockwise regularity). 
obtained, which is (without lemma handling) actually 34 only, as testified by the resulting 
Prolog code given in Fig. A.2. 
5.3. Experimental results: a case study 
This secfon gives a series of experimental results obtained with our implementation, 
the XRay system [77]. A more detailed report on experiments, test series generators, and 
further implementation details is given in [21,59] (or even [83]), so that we concentrate 
here on a case study illustrating the main features of the resulting system. 
So, for be.ing able to concentrate on the utility of the different features, we have decided 
to focus on a parameterizable series of test cases. This is provided by an encoding of the 
Hamiltonian cycle problem through default theories, as advocated in [24]. 32 This encoding 
is detailed in [59]. 
To begin with, we give in Table 1, taken from [59], a test series that provides 
experimental results on the impact of certain features on the runtime of our system. This 
is complemented by Table 2 that focuses on the compile time behavior and the number of 
inferences obtained by varying these features. 
Table 1 i:s filled with items containing a time measure in seconds, comprising system 
and user time33 (excluding compile time), along with the length of the resulting proof 
in parentheses. An entry like > 1000 means that no proof was obtained in 1000 seconds. 
The test series vary in two respects, leading to four different columns: the first two columns 
contain results obtained when checking first for the existence of a proof for the prerequisite 
32 Actually, the encoding maps the Hamiltonian cycle problem onto a query answering problem in constrained 
default logic (see Section 6.1); this is arguably the variant of default logic closest to normal default theories, as 
discussed after Theorem 6.1. 
33 The sum of both system and user time is necessary due to the underlying bi-processor. 
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Table 1 
Runtime experiments (on Linux Bi-PentiumPro, 200 MHz, 256 MB) 
ordering (Y-corn C orn-cr 
lemma handling 1 c 
people 0.08 (64) 0.08 (50) 0.09 (64) 0.08 (50) 
ham_4_min 0.01 (36) 0.0 (21) 0.01 (36) 0.0 (21) 
ham_4_max 424.03 (36) 16.99 (21) 1.34 (36) 0.5 (21) 
ham_5_min > 1000 > 1000 0.12 (52) 0.06 (26) 
ham_5_max > 1000 > 1000 7.51 (52) 1.66 (26) 
ham_6_min > 1000 > 1000 0.37 (71) 0.15 (31) 
ham_6_max > 1000 > 1000 330.53 (71) 69.72 (31) 
ham_7_min 1 1000 > 1000 1.03 (93) 0.25 (36) 
han_7_max > 1000 > 1000 > 1000 >lOoO 
ham_8_min > 2000 > 2000 11.83 (118) 1.76 (41) 
ham_8_max > 2000 > 2000 z 2000 >2000 
ham_lO_min > 2000 z 2000 27.91 (177) 5.38 (51) 
ham_lO_max > 2000 > 2000 > 2000 > 2000 
ham-2 O_min > 5000 t 5000 >5000 309.4 (101) 
ham-2 O_max > 5000 > 5000 > 5000 r5OcKl 
of a default rule and subsequently for its compatibility (during a &extension step); this is 
indicated by o-corn. The order of tasks is switched in the columns headed by corn-a. 
This is done via the compiler option described at (15). Furthermore, the columns differ 
as concerns the usage of dynamic lemmas, indicated by fZ. The configuration for dynamic 
lemmas was set to dynamic unit lemmas stemming from default consequents. All tests are 
done with blockwise regularity checks and without static lemmas. 
For a contrast to our scalable test series, we place in front a more meaningful example, 
people, given by a taxonomic knowledge base comprising 62 formulas, including 
disjunctive integrity constraints, implications, and default rules, over 40 propositional 
symbols. The test vector, obtained by querying a ternary disjunction, is representative for 
our tests on natural and well-structured examples: the choices of the underlying theorem 
prover are only rarely corrected by subsequent default-specific checks. Hence, on such 
examples, efficient query answering is more or less obtained by means of the power of the 
underlying inference engine. 
This changes when considering Hamiltonian cycle problems: we denote by ham-n the 
default theory corresponding to a graph with n vertices; it is build over 3 predicate symbols 
and II identifiers for the nodes. Let us note that ham-n contains only one classical formula 
and n2 - 1 defaults (see [59] for details on the encoding). 34 For instance, this results for 
34 To be precise, IZ x (n - 1) + (n - 1) due to the special treatment of the starting node. 
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ham-1 5, comprising originally 224 default rules, in an intermediate Prolog code (provided 
by XRay) containing 904 rules and around 400 kbytes; its compilation takes 3.9 seconds, 
including printing, under Eclipse Prolog (cf. Table 2). 
For the first test series, we have actually constructed for each problem ham-n ten 
different randomly selected permutations of the set of defaults. From these test series, 
we give for each column the minimal (ham_n_min) and maximal (ham_n_max) times 
obtained over these ten permutations. 
This witnjesses the important influence of “programming” the knowledge base, since the 
same proble.m, for instance ham_8, can be solved in a time varying from 2 seconds (in 
ham_8_min) to more than 2000 seconds (in ham_8_max) in the last configuration. We 
have pushed this a bit further by doing 200 permutations over the default set in ham_8. 
The minimum test vector 35 obtained was 0.05 (118), 0.02 (41), 0.04 (118), 0.02 (41). This 
phenomenon is due to the fixed search strategy imposed by the underlying Prolog system. 
In order to (diminish this influence, we may stick with PTTP’s iterative deepening proof 
search (although blockwise regularity guarantees a finite search space). 
Let us now take a closer look at Table 1. First of all, we observe that the use of 
dynamic lemmas always reduces the proof length and even more importantly the time 
spent for finding this proof. The latter is testified by the fact that no matter which or- 
der of tasks, is employed, we always improve (sometimes even by an order of magni- 
tude) on the elapsed time. The impact of lemma handling on the proof (and in partic- 
ular its length) is illustrated by Figs. 12 and 13, where the proof in ham-4 is given 
first withoult and then with the use of lemmas. In these figures, ext, red, unit, de- 
f au1 t and dyn- lemma indicate the application of an extension, reduction, unit, default, 
or dynamic lemma inference, respectively. 36 In fact, we observe that the (repeated) sub- 
proofsofgamma(4, (move(1, 31, vstd(3))) ,gamma(7, (move(3, 21, 
vstd(2) ) ) andgamma(3, (move(2, 41, vs t d ( 4 ) ) ) in Fig. 12 are entirely re- 
placed in Fig. 13 by using the corresponding default lemmas, since they have already been 
solved when proving ext (vs td ( 4 ) ) . 37 
Now, let us turn to Table 2 for observing the impact of the previous features on the 
compile time behavior and the total number of inferences. In contrast to the first series 
of tests, we refrain from permuting the Prolog rules and consider simply the theories 
directly issued by our generator. This has the advantage that all samples have an analogous 
structure. The first two columns of Table 2 indicate the considered sample and the 
configuration under which it was compiled. Symbol e stands for the previous lemma 
setting. Let us explain the table by looking at the first line of ham_3. The compile time 
of 0.07/O. 11 tells us that it took XRay 7 milliseconds to compile the source into the target 
(including printing); it took 4 additional milliseconds to dump the Prolog file to disk and 
have it compiled by Eclipse Prolog. The size of source and target code is given by the 
number of default or Prolog rules, respectively, along with the number of resulting bytes. 
For instance, the source code for ham-3 consists of 8 default rules; the corresponding 
source file has 863 bytes (including further text). In the first setting, this is compiled into 
35 Such a vet tar corresponds to a line in Table 1. 
36 A unit inference is an extension inference with a unit clause. 
37 Since XRay may use FTTP’s iterative deepening search, we can even assure shortest proofs. 
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ext(query) 
I--ext(vstd(4)) 
1 I--default(gamrna(3, (move(2, 4), vstd(4)))) 
I I-ext(alpha(3, vstd(2))) 
I I--ext(vstd(2)) 
I I--default(gamma(7, (move(3, 2), vstd(2)))) 
I I--ext(alpha(7, vstd(3))) 
I I--ext(vstd(3)) 
I I--default(gamma(4, (move(l, 3), vstd(3)))) 
I I--ext(alpha(4, vstd(l)) 1 
I I--unit(vstd(l)) 
I--ext(vstd(3)) 
1 I--default(gamma(4, (move(1, 
I I--ext(alpha(4, vstd(l))) 
I I--unit(vstd(l)) 
I--ext(vstd(2)) 
I I--default(gamina(7, (move(3, 
I I--ext(alpha(7, vstd(3))) 
I l --ext(vstd(3)) 
I l --default(gamma(4, 
31, vstd(3)))) 
2), vstd(2)))) 
(move(1, 3), vstd(3)))) 




I--default(gamrna(l5, (move(4, I), vstdtwice(l)))) 
I--ext(alpha(l5, vstd(4))) 
I--ext(vstd(4)) 
I--default(gamma(3, (move(2, 4), vstd(4)))) 
I--ext(alpha(3, vstd(2))) 
I--ext(vstd(2)) 
I--default(gamma(7, (move(3, Z), vstd(2)))) 
I--ext(alpha(7, vstd(3))) 
I--ext(vstd(3)) 
I--default(gamma(4, (move(1, 3). vstd(3)))) 
I--ext(alpha(4, vstd(l))) 
I--unit(vstd(l)) 
Fig. 12.Prooftree obtained from ham-4 witboutlemmahandling and setting corn-u. 
40 Prolog rules, having 11246 bytes, along with one query rule, having 442 bytes. The 
slightly different target sizes, viz. 11246 and 11207, obtained by switching a-corn and 
corn-o are due to variable namings done by the Prolog compiler. In fact, our pretty printer 
maps both to identical files containing 8186 bytes (by replacing variables like _g9 894 
by single letters). A larger difference is observed when lemma handling is done; this is 
even reflected by the size of the query code, viz. 442 versus 512, due to two additional 
variables for tracing lemma proofs. The size of the query rule is also interesting because 
its body contains the initial model-clause-set. By and large, we observe on these examples 
(comprising many default rules and few classical ones) a factor of 1:4 between the number 
of default and Prolog rules. 38 In all, the efforts taken for the overall compilation are rather 
38 The corresponding number of bytes is rather insignificant, since the resulting code is full of lengthy strings. 
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ext(query) 
I--ext(vstd( 4)) 
1 I--default(gamma(3, (move(2, 4), vstd(4)))) 
I I--ext(alpha(3, vstd(2))) 
I I--ext(vstd(2)) 
I I--default(gamma(7, (move(3, 21, vstd(2)))) 
I l --ext(alpha(7, vstd(3))) 
I I--ext(vstd(3)) 
I I--default(gamma(4, (move(l, 31, vstd(3)))) 
I I --ext(alpha(4, vstd(l))) 
I I--unit(vstd(l)) 
I--ext(vstd(3)) 
1 I--dyn_lemma(gamma(4, (move(1, 3), vstd(3)))) 
I--ext(vstd(2)) 
1 I--dyn_lemma(gamma(7, (move(3, 2), vstd(2)))) 
I--unit(vstd(l)) 
I--ext(vstdtwice(l)) 
/--default(gamma(l5, (move(4, l), vstdtwice(1)))) 
I--ext(alpha(l5, vstd(4))) 
(--ext(vstd(4)) 
I--dyn_lemma(gamma(3, (move(2, 4), vstd(4)))) 
Fig. 13. Proof tree obtained from ham-4 with lemma handling and setting corn-a. 
small, despite the fact that the measured times include printing and that we employ a 
multiple pass compiling technique for easing implementation. 39 
The last two columns reflect the resulting run-time behavior. The format of the last 
one is identical to the ones in Table 1 and should help to relate the samples with its 
two extreme mouldings given there. The last but one column provides the total number 
of inferences performed for finding the proof. 4o Actually, the given figures substantiate 
the importance of our refinements for enhancing the basic approach: first, we see that 
a preceding compatibility check allows for finding the same proofs with a significantly 
smaller number of inferences. The usage of dynamic lemmas reduces this even further. This 
is impressively witnessed by ham_4, where both features lead to a speed-up by several 
orders of magnitude, namely, 80 as opposed to 323136 inferences. Notably, both features 
are obtainable at low compilation costs: while task switching is even free, lemma handling 
adds (under the given configuration) only a single Prolog rule (for predicate gamma) along 
with one further subgoal for each S-rule. 
A signilclcant speed-up on Hamiltonian cycle problems is achieved by verifying 
compatibil:ity before doing the actual A-extension steps. In our particular case, this is 
due to the rather complex justifications. So, when it comes to guaranteeing compatibility, 
the subsequent proof search becomes constrained by the justifications’ consistency 
assumptions; in this way, we may discard a large number of putatively applicable yet 
39 In tbe current implementation, we actually goovertbe source code 17 times,ifall features areenabled. 
4oWe refrained from doing so in tbe first series of tests, since counting inferences slows down the theorem 
prover considerably. 
46 I? Schaub, S. Briining /Artijicial Intelligence IO6 (1998) 1-75 
Table 2 
Compile time experiments (on Solaris Ultra2,S 12 MB) 
Problem Contigu- Compile time Source Target Inferences 
ration (secskecs) (rules:bytcs) (rules:bytes) 
Runtime 
(sets (infers)) 
ham-3 o-corn 0.07Q 11 8:863 40:11246 1:442 302 
ham-3 corn-a 0.06/0.09 8:863 40:11207 1:442 28 
ham-3 o-corn, e 0.08/O. 11 8:863 41:13495 1:512 83 
ham-3 corn-o, e 0.09/o. 11 8:863 41:13495 1:512 19 
ham-4 o-corn O.lUO.16 15:1505 68:20999 1:516 323136 
hart-4 corn-o 0.12/0.15 15:1505 68:21079 1:516 162 
ham-4 a-corn, e 0.14/0.17 15:1505 69:25208 I:600 8079 
ham-4 corn-o, e 0.14/0.19 15: 1505 69:25354 1:600 80 
ham-5 corn-o 0.21/0.27 2412525 104:33730 1:590 369 
ham-5 o-corn, e 0.24/0.33 2412525 105:41311 1:706 14241619 
ham-5 corn-o, f! 0.2410.3 1 24:2525 105:41307 1:706 122 
ham-6 corn-o 0.3310.4 35:4035 148:51763 1:700 712 
ham-6 corn-o, I 0.38/0.49 35:4035 149:61855 1~796 176 
ham-7 corn-o 0.48/0.6 48:6131 200:72796 1:778 1225 
ham-7 corn-o,! 0.57lO.71 48:6131 201:87306 1:904 242 
ham-8 c om-o 0.69/0.84 63:8909 260:9909 1 1:875 1942 
ham-8 corn-o, C 0.7310.92 63:8909 261:120270 1:1035 320 
hair-9 c om-o 0.9Y1.16 80:12465 328:128785 1:955 2897 
ham-9 corn-o, C l.OY1.3 80: 12465 329:158569 1:1131 410 
ham-1 5 corn-o 3.9314.52 224:58133 904:416574 1:1447 15529 
ham-15 corn-o,! 4.45615.256 224:58133 905:531435 1:1757 1202 























incompatible defaults in the course of the rest of the proof search. This is a great advantage 
of an incremental approach to consistency checking. The inverse phenomenon (albeit with 
a largely different significance) is sometimes observed on our taxonomic knowledge base, 
where the choices of the inference engine are only rarely corrected by the subsequent 
compatibility check. 
Another significant influence on resolving Hamiltonian cycle problems is given by using 
dynamic lemmas. In addition, dynamic lemmas practically never harm the proof search due 
to their restricted viability. This can be testified by a failing query 4’ to ham-4 yielding a 
test vector 3964.03 (-), 191.64 (-), 17.69 (-), 4.64 (-) (in the format of Table 1). We see that 
despite the usage of dynamic lemmas, failure is detected much faster than without them. 
41 A failing query was obtained by adding f ai 1 to tbe end of the successful query. 
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Technically, this is due to the fact that (propositional unit) lemmas are treatable as unit 
clauses; hence the application of a lemma during a derivation never needs to be replaced 
by another derivation step (cf. Section 5.2.3). 
We have discussed the salient features of XRay by means of a test series on the 
Hamiltonian cycle problem. This problem has already been used in similar settings, 
like the colmputation of extensions in classical default logic [25] or the computation 
of stable models of logic programs [60], as a basis for a parameterizable problem set. 
Actually, current work includes benchmark generators tailored to query answering in 
semi-monotonic default logics, since the existing ones, aiming at the two aforementioned 
problems, do not apply. A selection of our generators and the resulting test sets can be 
found at [83], among them, test sets on coloring problems and random graphs, all of them 
initially drawn from the Stanford GraphBase [46]. For a complement, we also give at 
[83] a couple of example files stemming from an application on model-based diagnosis. 
A discussion of these examples is however beyond the scope of this paper. 
6. Treating general default theories 
Up to now, we have concentrated on normal default theories as a somewhat greatest 
common fragment of default logics. For generalizing the approach, we may actually 
take over most of the techniques developed in the previous sections. This is because 
full-fledged default logics, like classical [71], justified [55], constrained [30], or rational 
default 1ogi.c [58], differ only in the way they deal with the consistency check. Due to our 
modular treatment of consistency, we may thus concentrate on this issue, while keeping 
the techniques developed for deduction and groundedness. 
For implementing the (semi-monotonic fragments) of the aforementioned variants, we 
have actually two alternatives: either we address each variant in turn, or we provide a 
technique general enough to cover all of them. The latter option is clearly the more general 
one. Apart from the fact that it allows for realizing the first option anyway, it has moreover 
the advantage that we may mix multiple conceptions of default logics in the same setting. 
This is why we have chosen to pursue the more general approach. 
This undertaking benefits from the fact that its theoretical underpinnings have already 
been established in [ 121, where a context-based framework for default logics was proposed. 
In this approach each variant of default logic corresponds to a fragment of a more general 
and uniform default reasoning system, called contextual default logic. 
6.1. The general setting: contextual default logic 
As mentioned above, full-fledged default logics differ basically in the way they address 
consistency. While classical and justified default logic employ a rather local notion of 
consistency by separately verifying the consistency of each justification, constrained and 
rational default logic take a global approach by stipulating that all justifications have to be 
jointly consistent with an extension at hand. 
Let us illustrate this briefly by taking a situation frequently encountered when inviting 
allergic children. Assume the kid stayed overnight, and we do not remember whether she 
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must not eat eggs or whether her diet denies milk. If we can consistently assume that she 
may eat eggs, we will serve omelette, and if we can consistently assume that she may have 
milk, we will serve porridge. This can be represented by the following default theory: 
: eggs : milk 
- - 
omelette ’ porridge I 
, {-eggs v -milk} . 
> 
(19) 
While classical and justified default logic yield a single extension containing omelette A 
porridge, constrained and rational default logic provide two alternative extensions, one 
containing omelette and another one with porridge. Because all of these extensions contain 
moreover ‘eggs v -milk, a global approach does therefore not permit to assume both 
eggs and milk, while this is the case when treating justifications separately. For brevity, 
we refrain from commenting these results any further and refer the reader to the literature 
for a detailed discussion on the technical and intuitive consequences arising from these 
different approaches to consistency [19,30,35,38,68,80]. In summary, this literature shows 
that there is not only a formal need for distinct notions of consistency in order to obtain 
different formal properties, but moreover a need stemming from knowledge engineering 
due to numerous commonsense examples that demand one or the other conception to be 
handled in the intuitively more appealing way. 42 
So, in order to combine variants of default logic, one has to compromise different notions 
of consistency. [ 121 capture this by means of the notion of pointwise closure Ths (T): 
Definition 6.1. Let T and S be sets of formulas. If T is non-empty, the pointwise closure 
of T under S is defined as 
%(T) = u Th(S U WI). 
#ET 
In addition, Ths(0) = Th(S). 
Given two sets of formulas T and S, we say that T is pointwisely closed under S iff 
T = Ths(T). 
For illustration, consider how we can express the “context” witnessing the derivation of 
omelette A porridge from Theory (19) in classical default logic: 
Th{-eggs”-milk,omelette,porridge)({eggs, milk]). (20) 
This set comprises two consistent, deductively closed sets of formulas, one containing eggs 
and another one containing milk; taken together, these two sets are inconsistent and would 
thus yield any formula by applying deductive closure. Such contexts are made explicit in 
the framework provided by contextual default logic. 
In this approach, one considers three sets of formulas: a set of facts W, an extension 
E, and a certain context C such that W 5 E C C. The set of formulas C is somehow 
established from the facts, default consequents, and underlying consistency assumptions, 
given by the justifications of the applying default rules. For those familiar with the 
42 Interestingly, Reiter already anticipated in [71, p. 831 that “providing an appropriate formal definition ofthis 
consistency requirement is perhaps the thorniest issue in defining a logic for default reasoning”. 
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aforementioned default logics, this approach trivially captures the application conditions 
found in existing default logics: for y, e.g., (Y E E and -B $ E in the case of classical 
default logic, and (Y E E and -(/3 A v) $! C in constrained default logic. 
This variety of application conditions motivates an extended notion of a default rule 
[ 121: a contextual default rule S is an expression of the form 
owIoEIo!c : BCIBEISW 
Y 
where ow, CI!E, oc, /?c, BE, /3w and y are formulas. (YW, cz~, oc are called the W-, E- 
and C-prerequisites, also noted f?ereqw(6), PrereqE(S), Prereqc(@, PC, BE, & are 
called the C -, E- and W-justifications, also noted Justifc (S), Justify, Just$w(G) and 
y is called lthe consequent, also noted Conseq(G). These projections extend to sets of 
contextual d’efault rules in the obvious way (e.g., Justify = Us,D{Justif~(6)}). For 
convenience, we omit tautological components; a non-existing component must thus be 
identified with T. 
A contextual default theory is a pair (0, W), where D is a set of contextual default rules 
and W is a consistent set of formulas. 43 A contextual extension is a pair (E, C), where E 
is a deductively closed set of formulas and C is a pointwisely closed set of formulas. We 
give below the quasi-iterative characterization of contextual extensions: 
Definition 6,2. Let (II, W) be a contextual default theory and let E and C be sets of 
formulas. Define 
Eo = I%(W), co = Th( W) 
and for i 3 0 
d,= ‘~wIQEI~c : BcIBEIBw ED Wt-aw, EikaE, Citac, 
1 
I. ’ Y CY-PC, EV-BE, WY-Bw I 
Ei+l == Z’h(W U Conseq(A~)), 
ci+l =’ “WUConses(Ai)UJusrifc(Ai)(J”‘ifE(’i)). 
Then, (E, C) is a contextual extension of (D, W) if 
(E*C)=(gEi,gCi). 
The extension E is built by successively introducing the consequents of all applying 
contextual default rules. For each partial context Ci+r ,the partial extension Ei+l is united 
with the C-justifications of all applying contextual default rules. 41 This set is united in 
turn with each E-justification of all applying contextual default rules. 
43 Originally, Besnard and Schaub [12] deal with a deductively closed set W in accord with the closure of E and 
C. By compactness, we must actually never consider deductively closed premises for automated theorem proving 
purposes. 
41 To see this, observe that T/I WUConseq(Ai)UJ~~rifC(Ai)(J”tifE(’i)) = ‘hEi+,UJusfifc(Ai)(JUStif~(‘i)). 
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In [ 121, it was shown that classical, justified, and constrained default logic are embedded 
in contextual default logic. Linke and Schaub [52] extend these embeddings to rational 
default logic. For brevity, we exemplarily give the resulting mappings and refer the reader 
to [ 12,521 for the corresponding equivalence results: 
Definition 6.3. Let (D, IV) be a default theory. We define 
@m(D, IV) = (1 y 1 y! E D) , w) (Classical default logic), 
@JDJDL(D, W) =([ ‘a”ySBAy’ 1 y E D), W) (Justified default logic), 
(Constrained default logic), 
(Rational default logic). 
These embeddings extend to variants of default logic relying on labeled formulas (or 
assertions [19]): Delgrande et al. [30] show that constrained and cumulative default logic 
[ 191 are equivalent modulo representation. The same is shown by Giordano and Martinelli 
[40] for classical and Q-default logic [40], and by Linke and Schaub [52] for rational and 
CA-default logic [40], respectively. 
For example, we obtain for theory (D, W) , as given in ( 19), the following theories: 
@JDL(D, w) = 
11 : omelette ) eggs A omelette I 
omelette 
11 : porridge 1 milk A porridge 1 
porridge I 
, {-eggsv -milk} , (21) 
%DL(D, w> = 
1 I : eggs A omelette I I I ( : milk A porridge I I 
omelette ’ 
(22) 
It is instructive to verify that @JDL(D, W) has a single contextual extension containing 
omelette A porridge, while &DL(D, W) yields two distinct extensions, one containing 
omelette and another with porridge. This is due to the different consistency requirements 
used in each theory. While the C-justification eggs A omelette of 
I I : eggs A omelette I I 
omelette 
must not only be consistent with the extension at hand but moreover with all justifications 
of other applying default rules, the E-justification eggs A omelette of 
I I : omelette I eggs A omelette I 
omelette 
requires consistency with the extension only. This is why both default rules of @JDL (D, W) 
contribute to its single extension, whereas each rule of RoL(D, W) engenders a distinct 
extension. 
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In order to capture the family of default logics described in Definition 6.3, we may 
restrict ourselves to contextual default rules of the following form: 
(23) 
As motivated in the introductory sections, our approach relies on the ability of forming 
default proofs in a local fashion. This is why we have applied our approach up to now to 
normal default theories only, since these theories enjoy the property of semi-monotonicity. 
Analogously, our generalization relies on locally determinable default proofs: we call a 
contextual default theory (0, W) semi-monotonic if we have for any two subsets Df and 
D” of D with D” E D’ C D that if (E”, C”) is a contextual extension of (D”, W), then 
there is a contextual extension (E’, C’) of (D’, W) such that E” C E’ and C” G C’. For 
example, theories (21) and (22) are semi-monotonic. 
Actually, justified and constrained default logic enjoy semi-monotonicity in full 
generality. (Yearly, this carries over to the corresponding fragments of contextual default 
logic, so that our approach extends immediately to these variants of default logic. Notably, 
this extends to the union of the respective default theories; thus allowing for treating some 
default rules according to justified default logic and others according to constrained default 
logic. For classical and rational default logic, on the other hand, we must restrict ourselves 
to semi-monotonic fragments. (Such fragments should be determinable by appropriate 
stratification techniques; a concrete adaptation of such techniques remains however future 
work.) 
For furnishing an appropriate proof theory, we provide next a more proof-theoretic 
characterization of contextual extensions in the presence of semi-monotonicity: 
Theorem 6,-l. Let (D, W) be a semi-monotonic contextual default theory such that D s 
D* and let .E and C be sets offormulas. Then, (E, C) is a contextual extension of (D, W) 
iff there is some maximal D’ s D that has an enumeration (6i)iEI such thatfor i E I, we 
have: 
E q = Th( W U Conseq( D’)) 
C == Thmastifc(Dq @W-E CD’)) I ’ 
(24) 
W II Conseq( (60, . . . , Si-1 )) I- PrereqE (Si), (25) 




It is instructive to verify that this specification reduces to that given in Theorem 2.1 when 
dealing with normal default theories (no matter which translation is used). 
As another example, consider the instantiation of this definition for constrained default 
logic: while condition (25) as well as the specification of E in (24) remain the same, the 
definition of C reduces to C = Th( E U Justifc (D’)), thus dealing with deductively closed 
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sets. Another simplification is observed when regarding condition (26) due to the absence 
of E-justifications: 45 
W U COR!?eq({GfJ, . . . , Si-I}) U JUStifC({&), . . . , Si-l}) y 
-COllSefJ(Gj) V lJUStifC (Si). 
This consistency condition is actually closely related to that found in normal default 
theories (cf. Definition 2.1). While in normal default theories justifications coincide 
with consequents, they must be distinguished in a full-fledged default logic. In fact, in 
constrained default logic, this distinctive treatment is done in such a way that we can take 
over the whole machinery developed for consistency checking in normal default theories 
by simply replacing each manipulation of a consequent y by that of its conjunction with 
the corresponding justification fi A y . As a result, we can address compatibility checking in 
constrained default logic by maintaining a single model along with a single model-clause- 
set. 
In analogy to Definition 2.2, a default proof for a formula q from a contextual default 
theory (D, W) is then a finite sequence of contextual default rules (bi)ier with 6i E D for 
all i E I such that W U {Conseq(Gi) 1 i E I} I- cp and conditions (25) and (26) are satisfied 
for all i E I. Clearly, the first two conditions, that is, the derivation of ‘p from W and (6i)ieI 
and also groundedness of (Si)iel, are treated as developed in the previous sections. So that 
we can concentrate on the implementation of condition (26). This is accomplished in the 
next subsection. 
6.2. Generalizing model-based consistency checking 
In the sequel, we extend the model-based approach introduced in Section 4 to the general 
setting described above. For normal default theories, it was sufficient to furnish a single 
model of the premises in W satisfying all default conclusions in a proof at hand.46 In 
the presence of putatively contradictory E-justifications, however, we need more complex 
model structures for guaranteeing compatibility. In fact, we might now need several models 
of W, all of which must entail the consequents and the C-justifications of the default rules 
in the current derivation, while there must be at least one model of each E-justification 
among them. Observe that the models covering E-justifications are not necessarily distinct; 
distinctness is only necessary in the presence of contradictory E-justifications. 
Let us make this precise in the sequel. For a formula 4 and a set of models M, we write 
M b 4 if m t= C#I for all m E M; and M + 4 if m b -4 for some m E M. For a set of 
formulas S, we define its set of models as Mod(S). First, we account for the semantic 
counterpart of the notion of pointwise closure (cf. Definition 6.1): for sets of formulas S 
and T, we define 
Mods(T) = 
I 
&ET MO&S uMl> if T #PI, 
Mod(S) otherwise. 
45 To be precise, all E-justifications are tautological rather than non-existent. 
46 This extends actually to default logics employing C-justifications only, such as constrained default logic. 
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For a set of formulas W and a sequence of contextual default rules (&)i,~ of form (23), we 
are then interested in the set of models Mods(T) obtained by taking 
S = U’ U Cunseq({& 1 i E I)) U htifc((6i 1 i E Z]) and 
T = Jzistif~({& 1 i E I}). 
For readability, we abbreviate this set of models by Mw(Z); in analogy, we denote its 
subset 
{m E Mw(Z) 1 m + .hstifE(&)) 
by M&(Z) for i E I. In fact, for non-empty I, Mw(Z) equals UiE, Ma(Z), each of which 
covers a different E-justification .ZUStifE (&) in .ZUsfifE ((8i I i E I)). 
Consider .he semantic counterpart of the pointwisely closed set given in (20): 
This set of models is actually composed of two distinct sets: the model set satisfying 
eggs A -milk and the one satisfying milk A -eggs; they actually comply with M&({ 1,2}) 
and M$ ({ 1,2}), where { 1,2} is the index set corresponding to the default rules obtained 
by applying @ok to default theory (19). Such sets of models furnish the domain from which 
we select individual models witnessing the compatible application of default rules. 
Now, in o’rder to characterize compatible default proofs (&)i,l from a set of premises 
W, we cons:ider non-empty subsets M of Mw (I) such that M fl Ma(Z) # 0 for all i E I; 
and we use &I to indicate by writing M Cl Mw(Z) that this structural set inclusion 
property holds. Observe that for non-empty Z the existence of such a set M implies that 
all underlying sets Ma(Z) are non-empty. This guarantees that M contains at least one 
model for each E-justification Justify. In case Z is empty, we also deal with a non- 
empty subset M of Mw (0) = Mod(W) ; we write M &J Mw (0). The non-emptiness of M 
is guaranteed, since W is assumed to be consistent. 
For a contextual default rule 
and some index set Z = K U {i}, function V addresses condition (26) in Theorem 6.1 by 
mapping trilples of form (M, W, (Sk)kE~) with M & Mw(K) onto triples of the same 
format if condition (26) is true; it yields I if condition (26) is false: 
V(Ji.5 (M, W, (&)~E:K)) 
(M, W, (&)i,r) if M b y A /?c and m k BE for some m E M, 
(M’,W,(&)~,I) ifMky~r\c or m&tj3EforallmEM 
and for M’ & Mw(K), = 
M’ k y A #?c and m’ b BE for some m’ E M’, 
_L if there is no M” &K Mw(K), 
M” b y A PC and m” b BE for some m” E M”. 
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Observe that M’ EK Mw(K) implies M’ # 0 even though K = 0 due to the consistency 
of W. As anticipated in the discussion of Theorem 6.1, we may restrict our attention 
to singleton sets M’ in the absence of E-justifications; this amounts more or less to 
the approach presented in Section 4 (except for the integration of justifications differing 
from the associated consequents). M’ must contain multiple models when dealing with 
inconsistent E-justifications. In the worst case, that is when dealing with IZ pairwisely 
inconsistent E-justifications, M’ includes at most n distinct models. 
The following result shows that this approach is in accord with the conception of 
consistency expressed in Definition 6.1. 
Theorem 6.2. Let W be a set of formulas and (6t)icI a sequence of contextual default 
rules such that 6i E D* for all i E I. Then, we have for all i E Z and K = (0, . . . , i - 1) 
andL={O,..., i} that tf there is a set of models M CK Mw(K), then there is either a 
non-empty set of models M’ EL Mw(L) such that 
V(6i, (M, W, (&)kE~)) = (M’, W, (&)tE~) #condition (26) is true 
or V(6i, (M, W, (&)kE~)) = I iff condition (26) is false. 
Observe that M and M’ need not be distinct; thus covering the first two cases of V. 
As argued in Section 4, we must provide efficient means for supporting model searching. 
For this purpose, we use extended model-clause-sets of form 
where M is a (compact) clausal representation of 
W U CO?ZSf?q([& 1 i E I}) UJUStifc((Si 1 i E I}) 
and the Mi are (compact) clause sets representing Justif E(Si), respectively, for some 
default proof fragment (6i)iEr from (0, W). Similar to Section 4, we start with an extended 
model-clause-setof orm (Cw, 0) and a singular set of models M = {m} for some m b W. 
Also in analogy to Section 4, coexisting model sets and extended model-clause-sets are 
invariantly coupled via satisfiability. That is, for a model set M and an extended model- 
clause-set (M, (Mi]i,l), we have 
(This is trivially true for tautological E-justifications yielding Mi = 0.) It is important to 
observe that a model like m may cover multiple clause sets of form Mi whenever they are 
jointly consistent with M. That is, the number of involved E-justifications, 1 II, is only an 
upper bound for the number of models in M. 
The important reduction of the search space for models was obtained in Section 4 
by appeal to continued model-preserving reductions of the model-clause-sets along with 
information supported by the DME-derivations by means of lemmas. Actually, all these 
techniques apply also in the general case, although we must pay some more attention to 
their scope of applicability. This is due to the fact that we share M with all clause sets of 
form Mi. In fact, a separate treatment of all instances of form M U Mi would allow for 
applying all techniques developed in Section 4 in a straightforward way, yet at the cost 
(Cw70) 
where 
cw = {{+G, +Wl 
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MO = { t-Ml) ) 
W’, {W) 
where 
M’ =: {{TEG, -MI}, {OMg,}} 
M: == {{EG~J,{GMJ~I} ,.-+ {{E&II 
(M”, {M:‘, AI’,‘}) 
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MI = { {+JV Obl, 6,) } 
where 
M” == {{?EG, lMI}, {OMB,}, {POsz)) 
My == {{EGsl}} 
M’,’ == {{f’~fI6~}, (P06z)) - {i”16,)) 
Fig. 14. Governing compatibility while deriving OM A PO from @JDL(D. W). 
of more redundancy. As a consequence, we allow for applying freely unit-reductions and 
subsumptions on M, while modifications resulting from the same reductions on M U Mi 
are restricted to Mi . We restrict lemma usage to those depending on default rules involved 
in the current DME-derivation only. This is reasonable and actually highly efficient since 
these are trivially compatible. They are addable to M which allows for reductions in the 
entire extenlded model-clause-set, including clause sets like Mi . 
Let us illustrate this by verifying compatibility of default proof 
( 
( ( : ‘omelette 1eggs A omelette 1 I I : porridge 1 milk A porridge I - 
omelette porridge ) 
((61, 62) for short) for omelette A porridge from @JDL(D, W). We start by putting an 
arbitrary model of CW into our model set, MO. The extended model-clause-set (CW, 0) 
is given in the first line of Fig. 14. Applying one of the above rules after the other, yields: 
V(%, (MO, W, 0)) = Ml and V(62, WI, W, @I))> = M2, 
where model sets MO, Ml and M2 are given in Fig. 14 (while abbreviating milk, eggs, 
omelette and porridge by Ml, EG, OM and PO, respectively). Ml is obtained from MO 
simply by extending the only model; this model ensures the compatible application of 61. 
M2 necessitates the generation of another model satisfying the E-justification of 82. 
Let us take a closer look at the underlying extended model-clause-sets. Applying 61 
makes us add its C-justification omelettes, to Cw, resulting in M’, whereas its E- 
justification eggs&, A omelettes, engenders the creation of M’, . Observe that M’ itself is 
not reducible. However, we may reduce M’ U M’, by subsumption. But even though there 
are two alternatives for deletion, such a reduction must only affect clauses in Mi . This is 
why (OMs, ) is deleted in M\ and not in M’ (this and all following reductions are indicated 




CW = {{lEG, YMI}} 
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MO = { {-MI} 1 
W’, 0) 
where 
MI = { {+t Ob;, EGq} } 
Fig. 15. Denial of compatibility while deriving OM A PO from @CDL(D, W). 
when applying 82, we are forced to generate an alternative model since the E-justifications 
of 61 and 82 are contradictory. This does however not prevent their joint application, as 
explained above. Finally, model set M2 contains a model for 44” U M;’ and another for 
M” u M;‘. 
For a complement, let us see why 
( 
11 : eggs A omelette ( 1 1) : milk A porridge ) I 
omelette ’ porridge ) 
((6;) 6;) for short) is no compatible default proof for omeletteA porridge from @cnL(D, W). 
The proceeding is illustrated in Fig. 15. First of all, we observe that this example does not 
comprise any (non-tautological) E-justifications; hence there are no secondary clause sets 
in the extended model-clause-set, which allows us to restrict our attention to singleton 
model sets only. Applying 8; makes us add its C-justification eggss; A omelettes; to Cw, 
resulting in M’, from which we obtain a singular model set A41 = ( {-MI, OM,; , EGs; } }. 
M’ is then reduced by unit-reduction. Next, our underlying DME-derivation makes us 
check compatibility for 8;. The model in Mt does not satisfy the C-justification of S;, that 
is, 
{-MI, OM,; , EG,; } k Mls; A PO,;. 
Thus, we look for a new model testifying joint compatibility of Sl, and 6; (see above for an 
explanation). For this purpose, we extend the last model-clause-set by 8;‘s C-justification, 
resulting in M”. Applying immediate reductions yields a clause set with an empty clause, 
which indicates inconsistency. In this case, we were thus able to detect inconsistency 
without performing an actual consistency check. In terms of function V, we have 
V($, (MO, W, 0)) = Ml and V(6;, WI, W, (6;))) = I 
where Mu and Ml are given in Fig. 15. 
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For implementing the generalized approach to model-based consistency checking, we 
follow by and large the approach described in Section 5. This necessitates extending the 
datastructure ncapsulated by functor m/ 2 ; also, we had to conceive additional means for 
treating and -notably reusing as many models as possible at each compatibility check. All 
this is detaile:d in [21] (see also [83]). 
6.3. Experimental results 
The appro,ach as been implemented for enhancing the XRay system [77], whose overall 
performance has already been discussed in Section 5.3. Hence, we concentrate in what 
follows on the implementation of our model-based approach to consistency checking. 
For this purpose, we have developed a tool (see [59]) to build generic contextual default 
theories in order to be able to parameterize the number of model generations during query 
answering. Since we deal with different sorts of justifications, it is moreover interesting to 
study the influence of different compatibility tests. 
For abstracting from the underlying inferences, all generated default theories have a 
fixed inferential structure. As a result, all default rules are always applied in the same order 
for proving tlhe query; it is just the fact whether a call to predicate compatible results in 
reusing or regenerating a model that varies in the test cases. This gives us a constant effort 
for inferencing no matter how many model switches are provoked. The different number 
of model generations is achieved by reordering the literals in the set of premises (and thus 
in the extended model-clause-sets) in view of the fixed application order of &rules and the 
known sear& strategy of the model generator. As an additional constraint, we imposed that 
all E-justifications are pairwisely inconsistent so that different E-justifications give rise to 
different models. 
For brevity, we present here two exemplary test series, taken from [59], and refer the 
reader for more details to [21] (or even [83]): one series with 50 and another with 100 
default rules, each of which contains additionally 50 and 100 binary clauses, respectively, 
provoking a fixed number of model switches. This gives a putative search space for 
models of 2”O and 21°0. The number of effectuated model generations is indicated in the 
first column of the subsequent tables. We distinguish three major test cases comprising 
default rules having (i) only C-justifications, (ii) only E-justifications, (iii) both C- and E- 
justifications. These cases are listed in order in the columns headed by DC, BE and /?c + /?E 
in Table 3. The column headed by fit + BE distinguishes furthermore between test cases 
where model generations are originated by C-justifications (left column) and those where 
model generations are caused by E-justifications (right column). Each item contains a time 
measure 47 in seconds. 
Note that the two limiting cases are given in the first and last line, representing a single 
model generation and consecutive ones. Also, we see that model switches are generally 
more expensive in the presence of both types of justifications. This is reflected by the fact 
that we encounter higher figures in the two columns put together under /Ic + BE than in 
the corresponding ones headed by /?c and BE, respectively. 
47 As above, comprising system and user time. 
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Table 3 
Experimental results on model-based consistency checking (on lagaffe.univ-angers.fr HP 
715-64) 
#I50 I% BE PC +pE #/loo PC BE kk +BE 
1 3.6 2.6 5.7 4.4 1 11.1 9.4 38.5 28.5 
10 3.6 8.1 7.6 9.3 25 16.3 66.3 42.2 87.6 
25 8.0 18.8 9.8 19.1 50 46.6 132.1 92.5 166.2 
50 11.9 31.3 18.0 35.2 100 102.7 260.7 135.6 330.4 
We observe that model switches caused by E-justifications are more expensive than 
those caused by C-justifications. This is related to the fact that the latter impose a stronger 
consistency constraint than the former. That is, the consistency of a C-justification concerns 
all current models, while an E-justification needs a single model only. The failure of a 
model for warranting consistency is thus immediate if it falsifies a C-justification, while 
this involves some subsequent search for E-justifications: as witnessed by the second case 
in the specification of V, we verify that m F BE for all models m before the ultimate failure 
of consistency of BE can be confirmed. (Since our aim is to provoke model generations 
rather than recycling them, such a search is never successful on these particular test cases.) 
Note also that the sole use of C-justifications makes us treat in turn a single yet different 
model, while in our setting the exclusive usage of E-justifications provokes that each 
proof including n default rules involves handling n distinct models (due to the pairwise 
inconsistency of E-justifications). Hence, except for the case of a single model generation, 
the sole usage of C-justifications is better than using E-justifications only, because an 
individual model can clearly be maintained in a much easier way than n different models. 
The aforementioned exception is due to the fact that C-justifications are added to the 
primary clause set which is subject to consecutive reductions. These efforts however are 
rapidly amortized with an increasing number of model switches. Finally, we mention 
that we observed on non-artificial examples like those discussed in Section 5.3 very few 
model switches which indicates the putative feasibility of our approach in practice. A more 
detailed experimental analysis along with implementation details are given in [21] (see also 
P31). 
7. Discussion and concluding remarks 
We showed how Prolog technology can be used for implementing efficient default 
reasoning systems. This was accomplished by appeal to the approach taken by Stickel’s 
PTTP. We described how a default theory (D, W) along with a query (p has to be 
transformed into a Prolog program PO, w,+, along with a Prolog query query such 
that query is derivable from PD,w,~ iff (p has a finite default proof from (D, W). 
A particularity of our approach stems from centering it around local proof procedures 
that allow for verifying the validity of each inference step when it is performed. For 
simplicity, we have restricted the first part of our exposition to normal default theories, as 
the arguably simplest fragment of default logic supporting local proof procedures, although 
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the approach applies to any semi-monotonic default logic, as detailed in Section 6. Note 
that the treatment of such full-fledged default logics is identical to that of normal default 
theories, except for the compatibility check. In this way, our approach can be regarded 
as a general methodology for implementing semi-monotonic default logics, as a prime 
candidate for default logics supporting local proof procedures. 
From an&her perspective, we have shown how existing (high-performance) PTTP-based 
theorem provers can be enhanced by means for handling default information. For providing 
theoretical underpinnings for the underlying compilation techniques, we have proposed a 
top-down proof procedure based on model-elimination. We called the resulting method 
Default Model Elimination. This proof procedure has its roots in an approach to default 
query answering based on the connection method. This consequent integration of classical 
automated theorem proving techniques and novel default logic technology is a salient 
feature of the approach; it is in particular responsible for the overall performance of the 
resulting system. As a byproduct, we have put forward appropriate enhancements of well- 
known concepts in automated theorem proving, like blockwise regularity and diverse forms 
of lemma handling, for further improving the performance of our inference engine. 
And finally, one can view our contribution also as a (propositional) logic pro- 
gramming #system integrating disjunction, classical as well as default negation. That 
is, via the standard interpretation of logic program clauses (cf. [56]), such as p t 
q1,..., qm, not(rd,. . . , not (rn), where p, qi , ri are atomic formulas, through default rules 
of form 
41 A, ..r\qrn : -rl,...,-r, 
P 
we may actually experiment with the resulting default rules under the different interpreta- 
tions, given in Section 6 (here for n = 1, a generalization to multiple justifications is how- 
ever straightforward). This allows furthermore for investigating extensions, where p, qi , ri 
are non-atolmic formulas, such as disjunctive logic programming. 
Our approach is thus quite different from other approaches found in the literature: 
First, exlcept for [2,17,72,81], all other approaches, like [5,25,45,63,71], abstract 
from an underlying inference engine. We integrate both groundedness and (incremental) 
consistency into an existing standard theorem prover using a standard sub-prover for 
generating models. Poole proposes in [69] an approach dealing with the fragment of 
prerequisite-free normal default rules that is also based on PTTP In addition to the 
restriction to normal default rules, however, the restriction to prerequisite-free default rules 
renders an implementation of groundedness unnecessary, so that PTTP serves mainly as an 
underlying .theorem prover (also used for consistency checking via failing derivations). On 
the other hand, the resulting Theorist framework is rather advanced as regards variable 
handling, whose treatment is arguably rooted in [66]. 
Second, the methods described in [25,45,50,63,81] aim primarily at computing entire 
extensions in Reiter’s default logic; queries are then answerable from such an extension. 
This is somehow unavoidable in Reiter’s default logic, since it lacks semi-monotonicity 
and it does thus not allow for local proof procedures. This is why we concentrate on query 
answering from semi-monotonic default logics, which is actually much more apt to the 
standard query answering process of PTTP. 
60 I: Schmb, S. Briining /Arti&ial Intelligence 106 (1998j l-75 
Third, consistency checking is treated differently: for instance, Reiter [7 l] puts forward a 
belated consistency check; Schwind and Risch [8 l] computes first entire sets of “consistent 
default rules” and verifies groundedness eparately. 
Moreover, our approach differs from all of the aforementioned ones in pursuing a model- 
based treatment of consistency checking. This novel approach aims at minimizing compu- 
tational efforts by reusing models as compact representations of former consistency checks. 
We have demonstrated, on the one hand, that the crucial task of consistency checking can 
benefit from keeping models to restrict computational efforts to ultimately necessary ex- 
haustive consistency checks. In our framework, such an exhaustive (exponential) check 
amounts to the generation of a new model; otherwise, we rather aim at reusing existing 
models for performing a fast (linear) satisfiability test. In Section 4, we have seen that even 
though three different defaults were used, a new model had to be generated only once. The 
consistent application of the two other defaults was warranted by two satisfiability tests. 
On the other hand, we have demonstrated that the use of model-clause-sets together with 
a rigorous application of reductions, results in a significant reduction of the underlying 
search space. Furthermore, we have shown that the concept of default lemmas allows for 
additional avoidance of redundancy in model-clause-sets. In this way, we achieved a syn- 
ergistic and potentially parallel treatment of theorem proving and satisfiability checking. 
Our handling of lemmas is related to that of so-called nogoods in assumption-based 
truth maintenance systems [29]. For instance, Sattar and Goebel [74] use such nogoods 
for amending Theorist for recognizing inconsistent hypothesis. In our setting, a nogood 
is a kind of lemma consisting of literals that correspond to the justifications of defaults, 
whose inconsistency has been detected by a previous compatibility check. Whenever a 
DME-derivation contains each element of such a nogood as S-extension-resulting literal, 
this derivation can be rejected prior to checking compatibility. The integration of such a 
technique in our implementation remains an interesting piece of future work. 
The extended approach of Section 6 has provided us with a general framework for 
implementing query answering in default logics supporting local proof procedures. This 
was accomplished by encompassing the variety of consistency checks found in existing 
default logics. Actually, apart from capturing diverse full-fledged default logics, this 
approach allows us moreover to combine these variants in an arbitrary fashion. The 
resulting system is thus unique in offering simultaneously the expressiveness of multiple 
default logics. 
For finding new models, our implementation uses an adapted variant of the Davis- 
Putnam procedure [28], which is currently one of the fastest complete methods for finding 
propositional models. Our current experiments on “meaningful” (to be more precise, rules 
expressing taxonomies) and artificial examples (like graph problems, random problems, 
and other parameterizable examples) show that a model has to be changed quite rarely 
in the course of the proof search. That is, on many examples, we observed that the 
resulting default proofs contained only few occasions for distracting the theorem prover by 
choosing incompatible &rules. For instance, for deciding the Hamiltonian cycle problem, 
we observed on many examples very few model switches. This is an argument in favor of 
a compatibility check that reuses information gathered on previous compatibility checks. 
Actually, current work includes benchmark generators tailored to query answering in 
semi-monotonic default logics, since the existing ones, aiming at the computation of entire 
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extensions in Reiter’s default logic, do not apply. On the whole, our experiments have 
shown that the pursued avenue is quite promising. On different families of examples, 
our current implementation outperforms previous ones that do not rely on PTTP by an 
order of magnitude. In fact, credulous reasoning in propositional default logic is JC:- 
complete [42], whose two sources of exponentiality are reflected by an extended PTTP 
inference engine along with model handling capacities. Interestingly, the approach is quite 
orthogonal to that of computing entire extensions. For instance, DeReS [25] performs very 
well on graph-based examples, like Hamiltonian cycle problems. Similar problem sets are 
also feasibly manageable with our system (albeit on a smaller scale); the performance is 
however sub.ject o the ordering of the rules in the default logic program. On the other hand, 
we have observed impressively rapid answers due to short proofs on taxonomic knowledge 
bases, which1 made DeReS collapse. 
Finally, th(e natural questions arise, why choose PTTP when it is not unproblematic as 
regards the number of generated Prolog rules? And, are there alternatives to the choice 
of PTTP? For the latter case, we remark that while there are approaches that could be 
used in place of PTTP, it is certainly the simplest (for instance, the approach of Umrigar 
and Pitchumani [91] allows a simpler coding via an extended set of connectives; this, 
however, does not allow to apply compilation techniques). For the former, we note that 
the blow-up of the resulting code is still linear in the number of clauses, default rules and 
propositional symbols. Practically speaking, we have so far not encountered any space 
problems for compiled knowledge bases. Nonetheless, it remains an interesting topic for 
future research how approaches avoiding the generation of all contrapositives like for 
instance [7,8] and correspondingly the resulting systems [9] can be enhanced in a similar 
way. Another major avenue for future research is the cross-fertilization between top-down 
and bottom-up approaches to default reasoning, manifested by the distinction among query 
answering and the computation of extensions. In this paper, we relied on the property 
of semi-monotonicity for obtaining local proof procedures. It will now be interesting to 
see how techniques like splitting [90] and in particular stratification [26], which aim at 
computing extensions in a local fashion, carry over to a query-oriented framework. 
Acknowledgements 
We are grateful to Mark Stickel for providing us with HTTP and for fruitful discussions 
during his stay at Darmstadt. Great thanks are also due to the anonymous referees for their 
detailed comments. This extends to Philippe Besnard and Pascal Nicolas, who provided a 
constant valuable feedback. 
Appendix A,. Compilation results on examples 
For ultim,ate transparency, we provide the authentic knowledge base corresponding to 
Example (4) in Fig. A.l. The resulting (pretty-printed) Prolog code is given in Fig. A.2, 
whereby the Prolog code stemming from the query is put in a separate file in order to ease 
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% Filename : allergyl.kb 
% Usage : xray(allergy1). 
% Date : 14/11/96 
child. 
predispo. 
not-milk ; not_predispo ; allergen. 
icecream :- child : icecream. 
milk :- icecream : milk. 
sugar :- icecream : sugar. 
query :- allergen. 
Fig. A.l. The knowledge base of Example (4). 
re-compilation of subsequent queries. This code was obtained from a compilation without 
lemma handling. 
These files along with the ones dealing with Example (10/l 1) can be retrieved at [83]. 
Appendix B. Proofs of theorems 
B. 1. Proofs of theorems in Section 2 
Proof of Theorem 2.1. This is an immediate consequence of the general result expressed 
inTheorem6.1. q 
Proof of Theorem 2.2. The result follows from Theorem 2.1 by compactness and semi- 
monotonicity. 0 
B.2. Proofs of theorems in Section 3 
For the proof of Theorem 3.2 we need the following lemma: 
Lemma B.l. Let W be a set of formulas and 61 , . . . ,a,, be a sequence of default rules. 
Then, 
ViE{l,..., n} : W U Conseq((G1, . . . , Si_l}) I- Prereq(&) (B.1) 
iff 
ViE{l,..., n} : W U {Prereq(Sl) + Conseq(&), . . . , 
Prereq(&_1) -+ Conseq(Si_l)} k Prereq(&). (B.2) 






-6 = ireduction(nof_allerqen)1_7]. 
a~~e~qe~~_1._2,_3._4,_5._6,_7._8,_9~:- 
,_6 ,= 2._10 is -6 - 2). 
_I1 = ,allerqen,Lll. 








-6 = ,re*uctlon,r,llerqe",,_71. 
ident~cal_me*er~nar_chil*,_2~,!, 
-6 = [reduction,rlot_child) I-71. 
child, J_2,_3,_4,-4, -5._5,_6._7):- 






-6 = [reductlon(,,ot_lcecream,,_7]. 
lcecream,_1,_2._3,_4,._5,_6,_7._8,_9):- 
C-6 >= I,_10 is ._6 - 1). 
-11 = ,icecreaml_ll, 






_6 = Lreductlon,not_milk) I-71. 
milk,_1,_2,_3,_4,_5,_6,_7,_8,_9) :- 
l-6 >= I,_10 is -6 - I), 
-11 = ,milkl_ll, 







-6 - [reductlon,m=lk),_71. 
notJnilk,_1,_2._3,_4,_5,_6,_7,_9):- 
(-6 >- 2,_1O is -6 - 2). 
-11 = I"ot_mllk,_Pl, 








-6 = [reduct=onInotgredispo),_7,. 
JredisPo(_1,_2,_3,-4,_4._5,_5._6,_6,-7):~ 





identical_member (predispo,_l) , ! ) , 
-6 = [reduction,predispo) l-71. 
not_psedispol_l,_2,_3,_4,-5,_6,_7,_9):- 
,_6 >= 2._10 is -6 - 2). 
-11 = ,not_predispoI_Zl, 








-6 = [reduct~on,not_suqar),_71. 
suvar,~l,.2,~3._4,~5._6.~7,~8,~9~:- 
I_6 >= .l_lO is -6 - l), 
-11 = ,suqar,_ll, 
-8 = [extension,6 : sugar) I-121, 
ga~a,6,suqar._11._2,_3._4,_5._10,_7._12._9~. 
wmna,4,icecream,_1,_2,_3._4,_5,_6,_7,_8,_9):- 
(-6 >= 1.10 is -6 - 1). 
-11 = ,qamma,4,icecream) I-31, 
-8 = (defaultC4 : licecream-child : [[icecreamll)] 1_12], 
alphall.child, [I, ~1,_11._4,_13._10,_7,_12,_9~, 
compat~ble,I,icecreaml],~13.~5). 
~amma,5.milk._1._2,_3._4._5,_6,_7,_6,_9~:- 
C-6 >= l,_lO is -6 - i), 
-11 = Igamma,5,m~lk) I-31, 




,_6 >= l,_lO is -6 - I), 
-11 = ~qamma~6,suqar~1_31. 




,_6 >= I,_10 IS -6 - 1). 
-8 = LextenslonIl : alpha,l,child)) 1_111, 
1-6 >= l,_lO is -6 - 1). 
_8 = ,extension(5 : alphal5,icecream)F 1_111, 
icecream,~l,,l._3._4._5,_~0._7,_11._9~. 
~lpha~6,icecream,_l,_2,_3,_4,_5,_6,_?,_8,_9~:- 
C-6 >= l,_lO is -6 - 1). 







-5 = [extension,7 : query) I_Bl, 
allergen,[l.[l. ~1,_7~_9._1,_2._3,_4._8,_6)). 
writegrove*1_5,_6). 
Fig. A2 The Prolog code resulting from Example (4). 
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Proof. The only-if part of Lemma B. I is trivial since Conseq(Gj) subsumes Prereq(Gj) + 
Conseq(Gj). To prove the if-part, let j be an arbitrary number in { 1, . . , i - 1). In what 
follows, we abbreviate Prf?Wq(&) by Pk and COnSeq(&) by Ck. Since 
WU(p1 ‘Cl,... 
we obviously have: 
wu{pl+cl,... 
Pi-l + Ci-1 
Because of(i) {pi -+ Cj 
Pj-1 + Cj-11 k Pj (B.3) 
Pj-l+Cj-l~Pj’Cj~Pj9Pj+l+Cj+l~...~ 
k Pi. (B.4) 
uj} l- cj and (ii) cj subsumes pj + cj, (B.4) is equivalent to 
w u {Pl + Cl ,...,Pj-l+Cj-13Cj,Pj,Pj+l+Cj+l,..., 
Pi-1 + Ci-11 I- pi. (B.5) 
But due to (B.3), (B.5) is equivalent to 
w u IPl -+ Cl 3.+.,Pj-l +Cj-ltCj,Pj+l ‘Cj+l,...,Pi-1~Cj-l}t-Pi. (B.6) 
Applying this argumentation for each j E { 1, . . . , i - 1 ), we get Lemma B. 1. q 
Proof of Theorem 3.2. In what follows, let (D’, W’) be the atomic format of (D, W) and 
let CW be the clausal representation of W’. Due to [79, Theorem 3.31 it is sufficient to 
prove the theorem for default theory (D’, W’). 
(if-part) Let R be a DME-refutation for M with top-clause c = {q”}. Let D = 
{‘W,YlI,..., {-ak, yk} be the set of S-clauses used throughout R. In what follows, a 
S-clause {-a;, vi} is abbreviated by di. Let 6i be the default corresponding to di. The 
tableau generated by R is denoted by T. 
Since c is the top-clause of R, and a DME-refutation for M can be viewed as a restricted 
ME-refutation for M, we know (since ME is sound) that Cw U D U {c) is inconsistent. 
Sinceforeachi ~{l,..., k}, di is subsumed by vi, it follows that W’ U (~1, . . . , yn) t- cp. 
It remains to prove (see Definition 2.2) that conditions (2) and (3) of Theorem 2.1 can 
be guaranteed. Condition (3) is obviously fulfilled if W’ U {yl , . . . , yn} is consistent. But 
this is guaranteed by the compatibility-restriction of S-extension steps (note that the only 
possibility to use a di in a derivation is the application of a compatible S-extension step). 
To show that condition (2) holds is more difficult. This is due to the fact that in one 
subrefutation of R, a clause dj might be used to prove a subgoal -ai, whereas in another 
subrefutation of R, the S-clause di is used to prove ‘oj. Hence the order of the b-clauses 
in the tableau generated by R does not automatically give use the desired order of the 
defaults 61, . . . , &. However, such an ordered sequence &, , . . . ,6i, of defaults (which 
satisfies condition (2)) can be constructed in an iterative manner as follows: 
Let TC = (tl, , . . , tl] be the tableau clauses in T that were generated by a-extension 
steps. Let c = {loi, vi] be an element from TC with a maximal depth in T. Due to the 
definition of reduction steps, no reduction step used in the subrefutation Ri of -ai uses an 
ancestor literal of loi. Hence, the subrefutation Ri constitutes a refutation of -ai. Further 
(due to the maximal depth of c), all the clauses needed for Ri of lt~i are clauses from W’. 
Hence, W’ k cxi and we can set ii = i. 
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To determine i2 we first modify R (and T): every subrefutation of -ai, in R is replaced 
by Ri . This is possible because due to the definition of reduction steps, no reduction step 
in Ri can use an ancestor goal of -~i. Now, let TC = {tl , . . . , tl} be the tableau clauses in 
T that were generated by b-extension steps using clauses from {dl , . . . , &) - di,, and let 
c = (-ai, yi} be an element from TC with a maximal depth in T. Again, (with the same 
argumentation as above) the subrefutation Ri of -ai constitutes a refutation of -ai. Then, 
due to the above modification of R it is guaranteed that Ri only uses clauses from W and 
the d-clause di, . With Lemma B. 1 if follows that W’ U { yi, } I- cti and we can set i2 = i . 
This procedure can be iterated k times (since only k different &clauses were used 
throughout R). The resulting sequence 6i,, . . . , 6i, fulfills condition (2) which completes 
the proof of the if-part. 
(only-if--part) The proof of the only-if-part is an induction of the number of defaults used 
in the default proof for p. Let c = (@}. 
(n = 0) !jince the default proof for q uses no default rules, we have W’ F cp. Due to the 
completeness of ME, there must exist a ME-refutation R of CW U (c) with top-clause c. 
Since we have shown in Section 3.1 that a ME-derivation equals a DME-derivation without 
d-extension steps, R is a DME-refutation, too. 
(n > 0) Let 61,. . . ,a,, be the sequence of default rules used in the default proof DP for 
40. Note, that the existence of DP implies the existence of a default proof DP’ for 40 from 
((62, . . . , S,,}, W U (~1)). Since DP’ uses only n - 1 default rules, the induction hypothesis 
tells us thal there exists a corresponding DME-refutation R for Cw - (-Cal, ~1) U (( y1 }, c} 
with top-clause c. 
In what follows we modify R in such a way that the resulting DME-refutation R’ is 
a DME-refutation for Cw U {c) with top-clause c. To this end, we make use of the fact, 
that there must exist a proof for Cal from (0, W). Hence, there exists a DME-refutation R1 
of CW U {--al ) with top-clause (-al) which uses no S-extension steps. Further, we can 
assume that RI does not contain extension steps with clause (-al) since each open goal 
~1 can be solved via a reduction step to the top-clause literal 1~1. Hence, clause (-al) is 
only used as top-clause in RI. 
Now it is easy to construct R’. We simply replace each tableau clause {n) in R by the 
tableau clause (-YY~ , ~1). This replacement corresponds to a replacement of an extension 
step with unit clause (~1) by a A-extension step with A-clause ( -CY~ , ~1). The resulting open 
goals can be solved via a subrefutation corresponding to RI. 
That each of the a-extension steps used in R’ is compatible is a consequence of condition 
(3) of Theorem 2.1 and the fact that the set of &extension literals in the tableau generated 
by R’ equals (~1, . . . , yn) (consider the construction of R’ given above). o 
Proof of ‘I’heorem 3.3. Suppose the conditions of Definition 3.7 are fulfilled. Let Mw be 
the set of cc)-clauses in M, MD be the set of S-clauses in M, and let D’ be the set of defaults 
corresponding to the elements of MD. 
Then it is obvious that there exists a DME-refutation R with top-clause h(o) that uses 
only clauses from Mw U MD U ((h(ol))) U. . . U ((h(o,))) for extension steps. Further, the 
use of unit clauses (h(oi)) (i E (1, . . . , n)) in R can be restricted to w-extension steps that 
are applied to nodes that do not have ancestors which are a-resulting nodes (note that these 
unit clauses are only needed to “substitute” reduction steps during D; due to Definition 3.5, 
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these reduction steps were not used in a subrefutation of some a-resulting literal generated 
by D). This implies (see Theorem 3.2) that there is an enumeration (Si)i,l of D’ such that: 
Mw U Ch~eq({Sl, . . . , &i-l}) I- f’~~q(Gi), (B.7) 
Mw U Conseq({S1,. . , Si_I}) y -Conseq(&). 03.8) 
Now, it is quite easy to recognize that for every i E { 1, . . . , n} there exists a default proof 
of +(oi) from (M’, 0’) where 
M’ = Mw U { {h(ol)}} U . . . U {{A(&-l))} U {Ih(@+l)J} U”’ 
u { mdJ} u {VW}. 
This is due to (B.7) and (B.8) and the fact that 
Mw u Mo U { IUol)}} U.. . u { {WJJ} U { GWJ} 
must be inconsistent (otherwise R would not exist). Hence, we know that there exists a 
corresponding DME-refutation R’ with top-clause [;i(oi)}. 
Furthermore, due to (B.7) and (B.8), we know that the subproofs of S-extension- 
resulting nodes in R can be used to prove S-extension-resulting nodes generated during 
R’ without any modification. This implies, that in the course of R’, the unit clauses {h(oj)} 
(jE{l)..., i-1,i+1,..., n}) and (A(o)} are only used for extension steps to prove a 
o-extension-resulting literal that has no node among its successors that is a &extension- 
resulting node. 
Now we can turn to the proof of Theorem 3.3. For readability, we distinguish the nodes 
given in this theorem by attaching a prime to each identifier. We thus have: 
Let 7 be a tableau generated by a DME-derivation from CW U Co, and let b = 
(O’,, . . .) 0:, . . . , oh) be a branch of 7. 
If o;+,, . . . , uk are w-extension-resulting nodes and 1 G [h(oL), . . . , k(ok)], then b 
can be marked as closed without losing soundness. 
Let{ko,...,k,}beasubsetof{v,...,m}suchthatZ={h(o~),...,~(o~~)}andko<k2< 
. . . < kn. For simplicity, we assume that m = k,, (i.e., ui is the leaf node of b) (otherwise, 
lemma 1 could have been applied earlier in course of thlderivation). 
Due to the above considerations, we know that there is a DME-refutation R” with top- 
clause {h(d;,)} which uses clauses from Mw, MD and the unit clauses {h(oij)} (where 
j # n) for extension steps. Further, these unit clauses are used during R” only to prove w- 
extension-resulting literals with no S-extension-resulting literals among their successors. 
This, together with the fact that the b-clauses in R” can be used for any d-extension step 
without violating consistency (see the conditions of the theorem), implies that R” can be 
applied to ob . Only each extension step using one of the unit clauses (a(~;~)} has to be 
replaced by i corresponding reduction step (what is possible since o:+~, . . . ,oh are o- 
extension-resulting literals). Hence, b can be marked as closed. q 
Proof of Theorem 3.4. Since 7 is is not blockwisely regular, it must violate condition 
(1) or condition (2) of Definition 3.10. First, we show that in case 7 violates condition 
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(2), there exists a DME-refutation R” that generates a tableau 7” which does not violate 
condition (2). 
If 7 violates condition (2), 7 contains a branch b = 01, . . . , on that violates condi- 
tion (2), that is b contains two d-extension resulting nodes, oi and oj (i -C j) say, such that 
prev(oi) and prev(nodej) are labeled with the same literal. Since oj is a a-extension re- 
sulting node. no reduction step that was applied to a successor node of oj uses an ancestor 
node of oj (note that no reduction step can be applied to oj). But then, it is obvious that the 
DME-subrefutation applied to prev(oj) can be applied directly to prev(oi). The resulting 
DME-refutation R1 is strictly smaller than R, and the tableau generated by R1 is strictly 
smaller than 7. Hence, this transformation can only be applied finitely many times and the 
resulting DME-refutation R” generates a tableau 7” that agrees with condition (2). 
Second, we show that in case 7” violates condition (l), there exists a DME-refutation 
R’ that is blockwisely regular. Suppose 7” violates condition (l), and let 01, . . . , on be a 
block such that for two different nodes, oi and oj say, h7’ (oi) = Al” (oj). Then, let S1 be 
a clause set containing 
(i) W7”(ol)J, 
(ii) each tableau clause whose corresponding nodes are successors of 01 and belong to 
blocks starting with 01, and 
(iii) the unit clauses (A7” (ok,)], . . . , (AT” (okl)}, where Ok,, . . . , Ok, are extension nodes 
generated by S-extension steps such that for each 1 < i < I, Oki is a successor of 01 
and 110 node between 01 and Oki was generated by a S-extension step. 
Since 7” is a closed tableau, it is quite easy to see that there exists an ME-refutation of 
S1 with top-clause {A/“(ol)}. But then there also exists a regular ME-refutation Rs of S1 
with top-clause {h7”(ol)}. Let DS be the subderivation applied to k7”(01) that contains 
all derivation steps of Rs that use clauses from M (note that each of these clauses must 
be a o-clause). That is, the only derivation steps of Rs that do not belong to DS are the 
initialization step and extension steps using the unit clauses in {h7”(ok,)}, . . . , {hT”(okr)). 
Now, we construct a DME-refutation Rz from R” as follows: all derivation steps 
belonging to the subrefutation of 01 in R” are removed. The resulting derivation D1 
generates a tableau with one open goal, namely h7” (01). Now, apply DS to this 
open goal. The resulting derivation D2 contains open goals that are labeled with 
liter& frOn1 {--h7” (Ok, ), . . . , -h7”(OkI)) (in Rs, extension steps with the unit clauses 
{a7” (Ok, ) ) , . . . , (h7”(okl)} are applied to these open goals). Finally, for each 1 < i < I, 
the DME-subrefutation that was applied to oki in R” is applied to the open goals labeled 
with A7” (or:.). 
Note, thalt the tableau 72 which is generated by the resulting DME-refutation R2 cannot 
violate condition (2). This is because the transformation only affects w-extension steps and 
reduction steps to literals stemming from w-clauses. Inference steps that use literals from 
S-clauses remain unchanged. In particular, it is guaranteed that in case some literal L in 72 
that stems from a b-clause and has an ancestor literal L’ that stems from a d-clause, too, 
this also holds for 7” (and therefore 72 cannot violate condition (2)). 
However., R2 may be longer that R” and 72 may even contain more blocks than 7” that 
violate blockwise regularity. However, it is easy to see that the transformation can only be 
applied finitely many times. To this end, observe that the maximal number ml of blocks on 
one branch (does not increase during the transformation. Since m 1 is finite and the maximal 
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number of literals per clause is finite, too, the maximal number rn2 of blocks in a tableau 
is limited by a fix constant. Hence, our transformation can be applied at most m2 times. 
Afterwards, the resulting DME-refutation R’ must generate a blockwisely regular tableau 
7’. 13 
B.3. Proofs of theorems in Sections 4 and 6 
Proof of Theorem 4.1. Let W be a set of formulas and (Si)iel a sequence of normal 
default rules. Consider 6i for some i E I. 
By definition of V, we have 
V(&, (m, W, CSjljd)) =(m’, W, (aj)j<i) 
iff m’ is some model for W U (Conseq(Sj) 1 j < i). This includes the case of m = m’ since 
m is a model of W U Conseq({Go, . . . , Si-1)) and by definition of V, m b Conseq(&). 
And 
V(&, (m, W, (Sj)j<i)> = -l 
iff there is no model for W U {Conseq(Gj) 1 j < i}. 
We thus distinguish two cases: 
(1) W U Conseq({So, . . . . &-I}) tf lCOKWq(Gi). 
This is equivalent to W U Conseq({So, . . . , Si}) y 1. By propositional logic, this is 
itself equivalent to the existence of a model m such that 
m + W U (CO&Seq(Gj) 1 j < i} 
which proves the claim. 
(2) W U Conseq({Go, . . . , Si-I}) I- ~COKXq(&). 
This is equivalent to W U Conseq({So, . . . , 8,)) k 1. By propositional logic, this is 
itself equivalent to the non-existence of a model for W U { Conseq(Gj) I j < i} which 
establishes the claim. 0 
Proof of Theorem 6.1. 
(if-part) Let (E, C) be a contextual extension of semi-monotonic contextual default 
theory (D, W) . Consider the set of generating contextual default rules 
03.9) 
The case where r = 0 is trivial so that we concentrate on non-empty r: according to 
[12, Theorem 5.11, r satisfies (24). That is, 
E = T/t(E) = Th(W U Conseq(r)), (B.lO) 
C = %(C) = Thwuconseq(r)uJustifC(r) (h&fE(r)). (B.ll) 
Condition (29, that is groundedness, is also verified by r, due to the definition of a 
contextual extension. 
For ensuring condition (26), we observe that Justifc(~) # 0 and JustifE(r) # 0 
provided that r # 0. We have 
-PC 4 ThWUconseq(r)UJustifc(r) (JuStifE m) 
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for all PC E .Zustifc (r) . That is, 
Or, 
W U Conseq(F) U.hst$C(F) U {BE} if -/?C 
for all BE E .ZustifE (f ) . By PC E Justifc (r), we get 
W U Conseq(r) U Justifc(r) y -BE 
for all BE E JustifE(F). By monotonicity, this property holds for any subset r’ 2 r, too, 
thus establkhing condition (26). 




satisfying conditions (25) and (26). Condition (25) implies 01 E E. Moreover, we have 
W U Conseq( I+) U Justifc (f ‘) y -BE 
for all /?E E JudfE (I”). The fact r’ satisfies condition (24), yields by inversing the above 
manipulations that /Ic 4 C; also, we get from the previous non-derivability proposition that 
BE +! E by monotonicity. Consequently, 
lo!1 :kIBEI Er; 
Y 
a contradiction. 
(only-if-part) Let (Si)ieZ be an enumeration of some maximal D’ g D satisfying 
conditions (24)-(26). 
Consider the sequence of default theories 
({Sj E! D I j < i}, W) 
for i E Z along with a family of pairs of sets of formulas (( Ei , Ci))i,r such that 
Ei = Th(W U Conseq({Gj E D I j < i})), 
Ci = ThEi”Justifc((sjEolj<i))(JustifE(ISi E D I j < ‘I>)* 
With these, we define 
r,= loI :kkIbi 
I 
i 
ED @JEEEi,TBC$CiTIBE$Ei . 
Y 
By constructionof ((Ei, Ci))i,l and (T;)ieZ, we have 
E=[JEi, C=UCi, ~=UI;: 
iei id ieZ 
where E and C are defined in (24) and r is defined in (B.9). 
7-Q I: Schaub, S. Briining /Artificial Intelligence IO6 (1998) 1-75 
We prove by induction on I that (Ei+t, Ci+t) is an extension of ((Sj E D 1 j < i), W) 
and that (6j E D ) j 6 i) C I;:+1 for all i E I. From this, it follows by semi-monotonicity 
that (E, C) is a contextual extension of (D’, W). 
Clearly, (T/z(W), Thw(0)), or equivalently (T/z(W), Z%(W)), is an extension of (0, W). 
Now, suppose (Ei, Ci) is an extension of ({Sj E D I j < i), W) with (6j E D 1 j < i) C 
c. By semi-monotonicity, there is contextual extension (E’, C’) of ((Sj E D ) j < i), W) 
such that Ei s E’ and Ci C C’. 
Depending on whether 
si= IUI : BCISEI 
Y 
contributes to (E’, C’), we must consider two cases: 
a We have E’ = Ei and C’ = Ci and so either UE $ E’ or -PC E C’ or ‘BE E E’. 
Because W s Ei C E’ and {Sj E D I j < i) s c imply cz~ E E’ by (23, we thus 
have -/!?c E C’ or -BE E E’. 
According to (26) 
W U ConSeq({Su, . . , Si)) UJkStif~({&), . . . , Si)) If-B 
for all /3 E JudfE((60, . . . , Si)). 
By the fact that E’ = Ei = Th(W U Conseq({Gj E D I j < i))) and monotonicity, we 
deduce that -BE $ E’ (recall that /3~ = JustifE(%)). 
Rewriting the above non-derivability statement as done in the first part, yet in reverse 
order, yields: 
-DC 6 “WUC,,,e4({S,,...,Gi])UJusrifc((60,...,6i))(J”tifE(I’O, . . . t &I>) 
for all #Ic E Justif, ((60, . . . , 6i )) . As in the case of E’ and BE, we obtain by appeal to 
the definition of C’ and monotonicity that -PC $ C’ (recall that PC = JUstifc(Si)). 
This is in contradiction to the assumption that E’ = Ei and C’ = Ci . 
l We have E’ = Ei+l and C’ = Ci+l and SO a,y E E’ and -PC $ C’ and -BE 4 E’. 
This implies that (Ei+l, Ci+l) is a contextual extension of ({Sj E D I j < i), W) and 
that (6j E D I j < i) c fi+t. 
We have shown that (E, C) is a contextual extension of (D’, W). By maximality of D’, 
any contextual default rule 6 E D \ D’ violates either (25) or (26). This disqualifies any 
such 6 to contribute to any contextual extension (E’, C’) with E c E’ and C C C’ that 
could be obtainable by semi-monotonicity. Hence, (E, C) is also a contextual extension of 
(D,W). q 
Proof of Theorem 6.2. Let W be a set of formulas and (6i)iel a sequence of contextual 
default rules such that Si E D* for all i E I. Consider 
6i= Ia!1 :kIBEI 
Y 
for some i E I and K = {0, . . . , i - 1) and L = {0, . . . , i). 
By definition of V, we have 
V(&3 (MT WT (Bk)kK)) = (M’, W3 (~Z)l~L) 
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iff there is al non-empty set of models M’ 5~ Mw(L). This comprises the case where 
M = M’ because by assumption M & Mw(K), that is, 
M G lJkEKM;W) and MnMk(K)#0 forallkEK. 
Because M I= y A ,!?c, we have for all k E K that 
M~(K)={mI+WUC onseq(K) U Justifc(K) U {Justify]} 
= {m 1 m + W U Conseq(L) UJustif~(L) U (Justify}} = M&(L), 
while m b PIE for some m E M gives us (by recalling that BE = Justif E(&)) 
MnM~(K)#0. 
Hence, M is also a non-empty set of models such that M LL Mw (L). 
And 
V(&, (M, W, (&)/WY)) = 1 
iff there is no set of models M such that M LL Mw(L). This follows from the fact that 
there is no M” & Mw (K) satisfying y A /3c and including some m with m b BE. 
In analogy to Proof 4.1, we consider two cases: we thus distinguish two cases: 
(1) Condition (26) is true. That is, 
W U Conseq({So, . . . ,8i}) U JUdfc({So, . . . ,a,}) tf-J~~tif~(Sk) 
for all k E (0,. . . , i } . Or equivalently, 
W U Conseq({Go, . . . , &)) U JuGifc((60,. . . , Si}) U (.h.dfE(fik)) y _L 
for all k E (0, . . . , i). 
By propositional logic, this is equivalent to the existence of a model mk such that 
mk + W U Conseq((Go, . . . , Sj)) U Justifc((60,. . . , &)) U {JustifE(&)) 
for all! k E (0,. . . , i). 
Defining M = U kE~o,.,,,i~(mk) establishes the claim. 
(2) Condition (26) is false. That is, 
W U Conseq((Go, . . . ,%)) U JUstifc((So, . . . ,8i)) k dLYtif~(~k) 
for some k E (0, . . . , i). Or equivalently, 
W U Conseq((Go, . . . , Si)) U JUstifc((Go, . . . , Si)) U (JUStifE(Sk)) E I 
for some k E (0, . . . , i). 
By p:ropositional logic, this is equivalent to the non-existence of a model ink 
satisfying 
ink + W U Conseq((8o, . . . , &)) U Justifc((60, . . . , Sj)) U (Justify) 
forsomekE(O,...,i). 
In other words, M;(L) = 0 for some k E (0, . . . , i). That is, there cannot be 
any s’et of models M satisfying M EL Mw(L) since M f’ M&(L) = 0 for some 
k E (0, . . . , i). q 
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